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POSTRAcIAL DIScRIMINATION
By 
Girardeau A. Spann*
INTRODucTION
In one respect, the 2008 election of Barack Obama as 
the first black President of the United States may turn out to be 
bad for blacks, and for other racial minorities as well. Some have 
sug gested that the Obama election indicates that we now live 
in a post racial society, where discrimination based on race has 
ceased to be a serious problem.1 Others have strenuously con-
tested that claim, arguing that significant racial discrimination 
still exists in the United States notwithstanding the election of 
Presi dent Obama.2 But one thing does seem reasonably clear. The 
Obama presidency has served to embolden those who wish to 
deny claims of current racial injus tice.
Claims of racial injustice can now be challenged sim-
ply by ar guing that the culture obviously makes it possible for 
minorities to compete with whites on a level playing field. Under 
this reasoning, racial disparities that continue to inhere in the 
allocation of societal bene fits and burdens must be caused by 
the attributes of individual mi nority group members themselves, 
rather than by any invidious consideration of their race. Although 
the argument is by no means a new one, the election of President 
Obama now gives that argu ment more apparent plausibility than 
it has had in the past. Indeed, if one were inclined to preserve the 
nation’s tra dition of privileging white interests over the inter ests 
of racial mi norities, it would be strategi cally sensible to frame 
one’s discrimi natory impulses in precisely this manner. That way, 
the nation’s evolution to its sup posed new postracial maturation 
could ironically be utilized as an ingenious device for continued 
racial oppression.
The es sence of this postracial form of dis crimination 
would entail the transfor mation of a conventional dis crimination 
claim asserted by ra cial minorities into a claim of re verse dis-
crimination asserted by whites. That transformation could be 
achieved by stressing the ab sence of any le gally cognizable basis 
for providing remedial re sources to the original mi nority claim-
ants, in order to free up those resource for allocation to worthier 
whites. The tech nique would entail more than just the time-hon-
ored practice of evading a dis crimi nation claim by blam ing the 
victims. It would also re cast the minority vic tims as shameless 
perpe trators of discrimination, with all of the negative connota-
tions that an indictment of unlawful dis crimina tion conveys.
It turns out that this postra cial discrimination strategy is 
far from merely hypotheti cal. Its proponents include a majority 
of the cur rent Jus tices on the United States Supreme Court. The 
Roberts Court, despite its relative youth, has already issued a 
num ber of de cisions that employ the technique of postracial dis-
crimina tion to elevate the interests of whites over the interests of 
racial minori ties. The most revealing is its 2009 deci sion in Ricci	
v.	DeStefano,3 where a divided Court required the City of New 
Ha ven to utilize the results of a firefighter promotion exam that 
be nefitted whites, even though the exam had a ra cially-dispa rate 
impact that ad versely affected Latinos and blacks. The major-
ity opinion depicted historically advantaged white firefighters as 
the victims of unlaw ful discrimination, while depicting histori-
cally disadvantaged mi nority firefighters as the politically pow-
erful perpetrators of in vidious discrimination.4 The governing 
legal doctrines hardly com pelled the Court’s result, or the Court’s 
inversion of the customary categories of perpetrator and victim. 
In fact, both the statutory meaning of Title VII and the Court’s 
own precedents had to be modified so severely that the decision 
amounts to an ex ercise in conservative judicial activism.
In Title VII, Congress outlawed racially disparate 
employment prac tices unless they could be justified by a showing 
of job-relat edness, and by the absence of any less discriminatory, 
job-related alterna tive. In so doing, Congress struck a political 
bal ance be tween its pragmatic interest in protecting settled white 
employment expecta tions and its aspirational interest in dissipat-
ing the en trenched ad vantages that whites continue to have over 
racial mi norities in the em ployment market. Although this was 
a quintes sentially legisla tive judg ment—made by a politically 
accountable Congress, oper ating un der a constitutional form of 
government that assigns dem o cratic policymaking functions to 
its representative branches—the Su preme Court apparently dis-
agrees with the legis lative balance that Congress struck.
The Ricci Court not only mar ginalized the effective-
ness of statutory disparate-impact claims, but it also threatened 
to declare such claims unconstitutional. And the Ricci decision 
does not exist in isolation. When Ricci is considered in conjunc-
tion with other Roberts Court decisions concerning vot ing rights, 
racial pro filing, English language education, and school resegre-
gation, the Roberts Court’s race cases seem to fit neatly into the 
pattern of Supreme Court hostility to racial minority interests 
that is becoming the hall mark of postra cial discrimination.
Part I of this Article discusses the Roberts Court’s recent 
Ricci decision, highlighting the Supreme Court voting blocs 
that have developed with respect to the issue of race. Part I.A 
describes the majority and concurring opinions of the conserva-
tive bloc Justices. Part I.B describes the dissenting opinion of the 
liberal bloc Jus tices. Part II describes the doctrinal difficulties 
that are entailed in try ing to defend the Court’s resolution of the 
case. Part II.A ex plains why the decision does not fit comfort-
ably within the dictates of preexisting title VII doctrine. Part II.B 
explains why the deci sion does not fit comfortably within the 
law governing summary judgment. Part III argues that the Ricci 
decision constitutes an ex ercise in postracial discrimina tion. 
Part III.A describes how the Court inverts the categories of per-
petrator and victim in a way that ultimately allows it to invert the 
categories of discrimination and equality. Part III.B argues that 
the Ricci postracial discrimina tion technique is simply the most 
recent in a long line of judicial strate gies that the Supreme Court 
has historically used to justify the op pression of racial minori ties. 
The article concludes that the poten tial effectiveness of genu-
ine antidiscrimination remedies, such as the Title VII reme dies 
that the Court dilutes	Ricci, may be pre cisely what attracts the 
Supreme Court to its prac tice of postracial discrimination.
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THE Ricci DEcISION
In Ricci	 v	 DeStefano,5 the Supreme Court held 5–4 
that the City of New Haven was required by the employment 
discrimina tion prohibitions contained in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to utilize the results of a written firefighter 
promotion exam that the City administered, even though the City 
chose to reject those results because of the racially disparate 
impact that the exam produced. Whites gen erally performed bet-
ter than blacks and Latinos on the exam, and the City feared that 
use of the exam would subject the City to poten tial lia bility for 
violating the dispa	rate-impact prohi bition of Title VII. However, 
seventeen white firefight ers and one Latino fire fighter—firefight-
ers who would have been eligible for immediate promotions if 
the exam results had been certi fied—threat ened to sue the City. 
They claimed that a deci sion to dis regard the exam results would 
be ra cially motivated in a way that would violate the disparate-
treatment prohibition of Title VII. The City, there fore, believed 
that it was on the horns of a di lemma. Whatever ac tion it took, it 
would be sub ject to a Title VII suit filed by unhappy firefight ers. 
The City chose not to certify the exam results, and the disap-
pointed white and Latino firefighters sued. The United States 
Dis trict Court for the District of Connecti cut entered sum mary 
judg ment for the City, and a panel of the Second Cir cuit—whose 
mem bers in cluded then-Judge Sonia So tomayor—summarily 
affirmed in a one-pa ragraph per curiam opi nion. The full Second 
Circuit denied re hearing en banc, by a vote of 7–6. The Supreme 
Court then reversed the lower courts, finding that the City’s 
actions vi olated the disparate-treat ment provision of Title VII. 
Although the disappointed firefighters also claimed that the City 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro tection rights, 
the Supreme Court saw no need to reach the consti tutional issue 
in light of its statutory disposition of the case.6
The majority opinion detected an internal ten sion 
between the disparate-impact and disparate-treatment pro vi sions 
of Title VII. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justices Scalia, Tho mas, and Alito, resolved that tension by giv-
ing primacy to the disparate-treatment provision, unless there 
was a “strong basis in evidence” for concluding that disparate-
treatment was necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation.7 
Justice Scalia wrote a concur ring opinion, suggesting that the 
disparate-impact provision of Title VII was itself invalid, because 
it compelled the consid era tion of race in a way that violated 
the Equal Protection principle of the Constitution.8 Justice 
Alito wrote a concurring opi nion, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, arguing that the City’s stated desire to avoid a Title 
VII disparate-impact violation was a mere pretext for the City’s 
actual desire “to placate a politically important racial constitu-
ency.”9 Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent ing opinion, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, arguing that Title VII per-
mitted disparate treatment as long as there was “good cause” to 
believe that such treatment was necessary to avoid a dis parate-
impact violation, and stating that there was good cause in Ricci 
because less discriminatory job-related alternatives were availa-
ble.10 It is noteworthy that the Justices in Ricci voted in ways that 
are so highly correlated with their votes in other race cases that 
the Su preme Court can fairly be said to consist of conservative 
and lib eral voting blocs on the issue of race.
a. ThE conSERvaTivE Bloc
The five Justices who joined Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opi n ion in Ricci vote so consistently against the minority inter-
ests pre sented in race cases that they have come to constitute a 
conserva tive Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.11 
The mem bers of that vot ing bloc are Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. None of those 
five Justices has ever voted in favor of the racial minority claim 
at issue in a constitutional affir mative action case, a majority-
minority redi stricting case, or a ra cial integration case while sit-
ting on the Su preme Court.12
1. Justice Kennedy’s MaJority opinion
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci, joined 
by the other mem bers of the conservative bloc, held that New 
Ha ven’s decision not to certify the results of its firefighter promo-
tion exam in order to avoid a potential Title VII disparate-impact 
vi olation had the ef fect of itself constituting a Title VII disparate-
treatment viola tion.13 The opinion began with a detailed recita-
tion of the facts as Justice Kennedy viewed them, because the 
major ity’s understanding of what it held to be undis puted facts 
was im portant to the majority’s holding that the case could be 
re solved on summary judg ment.14
According to Justice Kennedy, the New Haven City 
Charter required the City to fill vacancies in its classified civil 
service jobs through a merit-based system including the use of 
written ex aminations. The City hired an Illinois company to serve 
as an out side consultant, whom it asked to de sign job-related 
exams that could be used as part of the process of identifying the 
most quali fied applicants for promotion to lieute nant and captain. 
The con sultant designed multiple-choice exams after a lengthy 
process that was intended to ensure job-relatedness. That pro-
cess included an over sampling of minority input in order to guard 
against unintentional white bias. The consultant also de signed 
oral exams containing hypotheticals that were intended to test 
for qualities including fire fighting, leadership, and manage ment 
skills. According to the em ployment contract be tween the City 
and the firefighters union, the written exams were to account for 
60% of an ap plicant’s total eligibility score, and the oral exams 
were to account for the remaining 40%.15
When the written and oral exams were administered 
to promo tion candidates in Decem ber 2003, the written exams 
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Although a num-
ber of whites, blacks and Latinos had taken the exams, all ten 
applicants who scored high enough to be eligible for “immediate 
promotion” to lieutenant were white. Of the nine appli cants who 
scored high enough to be eligible for immediate promotion to 
cap tain, seven were white and two were Latino.16
The City’s legal counsel believed that the results of the 
written firefighter promotion exams might constitute a violation 
of the dis parate-impact provision of Title VII, and that the need 
to avoid such a violation might authorize the use of race-con-
scious reme dies for the disparate impact produced by the exams. 
The legal counsel com municated those views to the New Haven 
Civil Ser vice Board, which was the municipal agency charged 
with certify ing the results of promotional exams for civil service 
positions.17 As a result, the Civil Service Board held a series of 
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meetings to determine whether it should certify the exam results 
in light of the disparate impact produced by the exams. At these 
meetings, some firefighters who took the exams defended the 
results. They included the named plaintiff Frank Ricci—a dys-
lexic firefighter who spent considerable time and money prepar-
ing for his written exam. Other firefighters who took the exams 
spoke against certifying the results, describing the exam ques-
tions as out dated and not relevant to firefighting practices in New 
Haven.18
The President of the New Haven firefighters union 
asked the Civil Service Board to conduct a validation study to 
determine whether the ex ams were job-related. Representatives 
of the Inter national Associ ation of Black Professional Firefight-
ers urged the Board to reject the exam results, arguing that the 
exam was “inhe rently unfair,” that a validation study for the exam 
was necessary, and that the exam results could be ad justed to 
avoid their racially disparate impact.19 The Illinois consultant 
who developed the ex ams testified that his company possessed 
substan tial experience developing similar exams in other cities, 
that it had taken precau tions to ensure that the exams were job-
related, and that the exams minimized the pos sibility of any racial 
bias.20 Another consultant, who sometimes competed with the 
consultant who designed the New Haven exams, testified that he 
was a bit sur prised by the de gree of dispa rate impact exhibited in 
the New Ha ven exams, but noted that whites generally perform 
better than minori ties on such written exams. The competing 
consultant also testified that an al ternative selec tion procedure, 
using “assessment centers” rather than written ex ams, could bet-
ter gauge a candidate’s reactions to real world fire fighting situa-
tions. He concluded, however, that the New Haven exam results 
could be certified as stemming from a “reasonably good test,” 
and that assessment centers might be used in the fu ture.21 A 
retired black fire captain, who was a fire program special ist at the 
De partment of Homeland Security, testified that the exam ques-
tions seemed relevant, and noted that whites gener ally perform 
better than minorities on written tests. A Boston Col lege profes-
sor of race and culture also testified that whites typi cally outper-
form mi norities on written tests, and further stated that the New 
Haven exams might have been developed in a subtly skewed way 
that could have favored white candidates.22
At the Civil Service Board’s final meeting on the issue, 
the City’s legal counsel argued that he now believed that federal 
law prohibited certification of the exam results because of their 
dispa rate impact, which was greater than the disparate impact 
exhibited in the City’s prior exams. He also thought that the 
testimony com piled by the Board showed that there were less 
discriminatory al ternatives to the New Haven exams that had 
produced the racially disparate impact. The City’s chief admin-
istrator, who spoke on behalf of Mayor DeStefano, also argued 
against certification be cause less discriminatory alternatives 
existed. In addition, the City’s human resources director argued 
against certification, fa voring the use of a less discriminatory 
alternative.23 However, other witnesses at this final meeting 
favored certification of the re sults. These included the President 
of the New Haven firefighters union, who emphasized the evi-
dence showing that the exams were fair and reasonable. The wit-
nesses favoring certification also in cluded plaintiff Ricci, who 
conceded that assessment centers might be a less discrimina tory 
alternative. However, Ricci emphasized that assess ment centers 
were not available for the 2003 round of promotions, and that 
assessment center protocols would take several years to develop. 
After this series of meetings, the Civil Service Board deadlocked 
2–2 on the certification question, meaning that the exam results 
were not certi fied.24
The disappointed firefighter pro motion candidates, who 
were plaintiffs in the District Court and petitioners in the Supreme 
Court, alleged that the City’s refusal to certify the exam results 
constituted unlawful discrimination that violated the disparate-
treatment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Of the seventeen whites and two Latinos who were eligible for 
immediate promotions based on the contested exam results, all 
but one Latino sued New Haven officials to challenge the City’s 
re fusal to certify the exam results. They also alleged a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. The parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment, with the City arguing that it had good cause 
for any dis parate treatment in which it had engaged, because the 
City was trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-impact violation. 
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 
entered sum mary judgment for the City, finding that the desire to 
avoid dispa rate-impact liability did not establish the discrimina-
tory intent ne ces sary for a Title VII disparate-treatment violation, 
and that the City’s actions did not violate the Equal Protection 
rights of the plaintiffs. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Cir cuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opin-
ion that adopted the reasoning of the District Court, and denied 
rehearing en banc by a vote of 7–6 over two written dissents. 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider what it 
viewed as a novel ques tion presented by the interaction between 
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII.25 The Solicitor Gen eral of the United States partici pated as 
amicus curiae, urging af firmance of the lower court decisions.26
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis first addressed the Title 
VII statutory claim asserted by the petitioners, which was ulti-
mately resolved in a way that avoided the need to address the 
constitu tional Equal Protection claim.27 Justice Kennedy noted 
that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and that the Title VII 
prohibition applies to both intentional “disparate-treatment” dis-
crimination and unin tentional “disparate-impact” discrimination. 
As originally en acted in 1964, the language of Title VII prohib-
ited only in ten tional dis parate-treatment discrimination, but the 
1971 Supreme Court deci sion in Griggs	v.	Duke Power28 inter-
preted the statute to pro hi bit unintentional disparate-impact dis-
crimination as well. Under Griggs, an employment practice with 
a racially disparate impact constituted a Title VII violation unless 
the employer could estab lish that the practice was sufficiently job 
related to constitute a “business necessity.” In Albemarle	Paper	
Co.	v.	Moody,29 the Su preme Court further held that even a dem-
onstration of job-related business necessity would not suffice to 
avoid Title VII disparate-impact lia bility if the plaintiff could 
establish that a less dis crimi natory alternative practice would also 
serve the employer’s legiti mate business needs. The Griggs read-
ing of Title VII was formally codified by Congress in the Civil 
Rights Act ofAlthough the firefighter promotion exam results did 
establish a prima facie Title VII unintentional disparate-impact 
violation, the City’s race-based decision to remedy that prima 
facie violation by refusing to certify the exam results would also 
constitute a Title VII intentional disparate-treatment violation, 
unless the refusal to certify was adequately justified. The District 
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Court, and the United States as amicus curiae, believed that the 
motive of preventing a disparate-impact violation could not, as a 
matter of law, constitute a disparate-treatment violation, but Jus-
tice Kennedy concluded that this analysis was wrong because it 
applied the wrong legal stan dard. The fact that the City may have 
had a permissible objective in seeking to avoid disparate impact 
did not establish that race-based means of achieving that objec-
tive were permissible.31
Because Justice Kennedy found the disparate-treatment 
and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII to be in conflict, he 
consi dered possible ways of resolving that conflict while still 
advancing the ultimate purpose of Title VII, which was to provide 
a workplace “where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”32 He 
re jected the petitioners’ suggestion that unintentional disparate-
im pact discrimination could never justify intentional disparate-
treat ment discrimination, concluding that both statutory goals 
had to be accommodated if possible. He then rejected the peti-
tioner’s argu ment that disparate treatment should only be permis-
sible if it were first established that a disparate-impact violation 
actually existed. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a holding 
would undermine the desire of Congress to promote voluntary 
compliance with Title VII, by forcing employers to address 
ambiguous disparate-im pact claims only at their peril.33
Justice Kennedy also rejected the suggestion made by 
the res pondent City, and by the United States, that intentional 
disparate-treatment should be permissible whenever an employer 
had a good-faith belief that such disparate treatment was nec-
essary to avoid a disparate-impact violation. Justice Kennedy 
concluded that this good-faith standard would ignore the “foun-
dational prohibi tion” of Title VII, which bars employers from tak-
ing adverse em ployment actions “because of…race.”34 It would 
“encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate 
impact,” in a way that “amounted to a de	facto quota system” that 
focused unduly on sta tistics. “Even worse,” such reliance on sta-
tistical disparities would permit an employer to pursue a desired 
“racial balance” in viola tion of Title VII’s express disclaimer of 
any interpretation “calling for outright racial balancing.”35
Justice Kennedy borrowed what he believed to be the 
appropri ate compromise standard from prior Supreme Court 
affirmative action cases that addressed the tension between the 
goals of advancing prospective race neutrality and providing a 
remedy for past dis crimination. In the affirmative action context, 
the Court previously held that the Equal Protection clause pro-
hibits the use of race-based affirmative action remedies unless 
there is a “strong basis in evi dence” establishing that race-based 
remedies are neces sary.36 Even though the Title VII statutory 
constraints might not be paral lel in all respects to the constitu-
tional constraints, Justice Kennedy found that the constitutional 
principles still provided helpful guid ance in the statutory context. 
The “strong basis in evi dence” stan dard gave effect to both the 
disparate-treatment and disparate-im pact provisions of Title VII. 
It left ample room for voluntary em ployer compliance efforts, 
while appropriately con straining em ployer discretion in making 
race-based decisions.37
Justice Kennedy viewed the “strong basis in evidence” 
stan dard as consistent with the Title VII prohibition on making 
racial adjustments to employment-related test scores, and with 
the need to protect the “legitimate expectations” of those who 
would be burdened by the abandonment of such test scores solely 
because of race-based statistics. He reasoned that, if Title VII 
prohibited ad justing test scores, it also prohibited “the greater 
step of discarding the test altogether.”38 The “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard was also consistent with Title VII’s protection of 
bona fide promotional examinations.39 Because the Court would 
go on to hold that New Haven did not satisfy the “strong basis in 
evidence” standard, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion expressly 
declined to reach the question of whether the Title VII disparate-
impact provision itself would be constitutional in a case where 
the standard had been met.40 He did, however, emphasize that 
Title VII did not prohibit an employer from intentionally design-
ing a test or employment practice in a way that would provide a 
fair opportunity for all indi viduals to compete regardless of their 
race.41
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion went on to hold 
that New Haven’s decision not to certify the firefighter promo-
tion exam re sults violated the disparate-treatment provision 
of Title VII. What ever the City’s subjective motive, the record 
made it clear that there was no objectively strong basis in evi-
dence to support a dispa rate-impact violation.42 Moreover, the 
disappointed firefighter peti tioners were entitled to summary 
judgment, because this lack of a strong basis in evidence was 
established by undisputed facts. Even though summary judgment 
requires the facts to be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, here there was no “genuine” dispute about the 
pertinent facts, because no rational trier of fact looking at the 
record as a whole could conclude that there was a strong basis 
in evidence to fear that certification of the exam scores would 
amount to a disparate-impact violation.43
The exam pass rate for minorities, which was approxi-
mately 50% of the pass rate for whites, did establish a prima 
facie ra cially disparate impact that was well below the 80% stan-
dard used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
to im plement the Title VII disparate-impact provision. That was 
espe cially true since no black candidates could have been consid-
ered for any of the available promotions if the exam scores were 
used. However, that threshold statistical disparity was “far from 
a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable 
under Title VII had it certified the results.”44 Despite the statisti-
cal discre pancy, the City would be liable for a disparate-impact 
violation only if its ex ams were not job related, or if there were 
a less dis criminatory al ternative, and neither condition could be 
satisfied under the “strong basis in evidence” standard.45
There was no genuine dispute concerning whether the 
exams were job-related and consistent with business necessity, 
because the City’s contrary assertions were “blatantly contra-
dicted by the record.”46 The consultant who designed the exams 
took great pains to ensure their job-relatedness, and most of the 
witnesses who tes tified before the Civil Service Board found the 
exams to be ade quate in this regard. Even the competitor consul-
tant, who had some criticisms of the examination design process, 
recommended certification after concluding that the exams were 
“reasonably good.”.47 The City did not even ask the consultant 
for the technical report to which it was entitled, and which could 
have explained any of the City’s job-relation concerns.48
There was also no strong basis in evidence for believ-
ing that an equally valid but less discriminatory alternative to 
the exams might exist. First, although the use of a 30/70 percent 
weighting of the written and oral exam scores might have reduced 
the racially dis parate impact that was produced by the 60/40 per-
cent weighting that was actually used, the 60/40 weighting was 
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the weighting spe cified in the firefighter union contract with the 
City. In addition, there was no evidence that the 60/40 weighting 
was arbitrary, or that a 30/70 weighting would produce an equally 
valid measure of the proper mix between job knowledge and situ-
ational skills.49 Second, although “banding” exam scores could 
have reduced dis parate im pact by ranking candidates along fewer 
categories of scores—and thereby producing more ties among 
candidates—a state court held that such banding violated the 
City Charter. Moreover, such banding, motivated by a desire to 
increase minor ity promotions, would have violated the Title VII 
prohibition against adjusting test results on the basis of race.50 
Third, although the competitor consul tant suggested that the use 
of assessment centers instead of written exams could provide a 
job-related selec tion method that would have less of a racially 
disparate impact, there was testimony that assessment centers 
could not have been used for the 2003 promo tions. In any case, 
the competitor consultant was primarily interested in marketing 
his own services—a strategy that proved successful, because 
New Haven did subsequently hire him as a consultant.51
Justice Kennedy’s opinion concluded by stressing that 
fear of litigation alone cannot constitute the strong basis in 
evidence re quired to permit intentional race-based disparate 
treatment under Title VII. He characterized the New Haven exam-
ination process as a fair and neutral way to determine which fire-
fighters were entitled to promotions based on their qualifications 
and experience. The City’s refusal to certify the results of that 
examination procedure imposed a burden 
on those who had participated in the test-
ing process—a burden that was aggravated 
by the City’s reliance on “raw racial statis-
tics.” Justice Kennedy went on to state that 
the Court’s deci sion should make it clear 
that, if the minority firefight ers now filed 
a disparate-impact suit against the City for 
certifying the exam re sults, the City would 
be able to avoid Title VII dispa rate-impact 
liability for its actions.52 The majority’s 
disposition of the case in favor of the dis-
appointed firefighters made it unneces sary 
to con sider the constitutional Equal Protec-
tion claims asserted by the petitioners.53
2. Justice scalia’s concurring opinion
Justice Scalia, alone in his concurring opinion, argued 
that the Court would even tually have to decide whether the dis-
parate-impact provision of Title VII was itself unconstitutional 
as a violation of the Equal Protection principle. Although he 
characterized the question as “not an easy one,” Justice Scalia 
seemed to embrace the argument that he outlined for finding the 
disparate-impact provision to be unconstitutional.54 Because the 
federal government cannot discri mi nate on the basis of race, it 
cannot by statute require public or private employers to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.55 How ever, Title VII’s disparate-impact 
provision requires employers to “place a racial thumb on the 
scales” in assessing and remedying the sta tistical outcomes of 
their employment policies, and “that type of racial decisionmak-
ing is, as the Court explains, discrimi natory.”56
Justice Scalia believed that the Title VII disparate impact 
pro vision did not mandate the use of racial quotas, but that it did 
compel an employer to “intentionally design his hiring practices 
to achieve the same end.” As a result, Justice Scalia concluded 
that “[i]nten tion al discrimination is still occurring, just one step 
up the chain.”57 He also stated that it would not matter if Title 
VII re quired the “consideration of race on a wholesale, rather 
than a re tail, level,” because the Government “must treat citizens 
as indi viduals not as simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual or national class.”58 He also stressed that “of course the 
purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions 
cannot save the statute.”59
Justice Scalia thought that it might be theoretically pos-
sible to defend a disparate-impact provision as simply an eviden-
tiary tool that could be used to “smoke out” intentional disparate 
treatment.60 However, such a theory could not save the consti-
tutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provision, because 
it did not recognize an affirmative defense for good faith.61 
Although the majority’s disposition precluded the need to rule 
upon the constitutionality of the Title VII disparate-impact provi-
sion in Ricci, “the war between disparate impact and equal pro-
tection will be waged sooner or later.”62
3. Justice alito’s concurring opinion
Justice Alito’s concurrence stated that it was written to 
address omissions in the dissent’s recitation of the facts, and to 
establish that, even under the dissent’s view of the facts, there 
were factual disputes that precluded sum-
mary judg ment for the City.63 Justice Alito’s 
opinion was joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, but not by Chief Justice Ro berts 
or Justice Kennedy.
Justice Alito believed that an 
objective and a subjective ques tion had to 
be answered in order to determine whether 
an employer could avoid Title VII liability 
for a disparate-treatment claim such as that 
filed by the disappointed firefighters. The 
objective ques tion was whether the stated 
reason for the disparate treatment was 
a legitimate reason under Title VII. The 
subjective question, which implicated the 
employer’s actual intent, was whether the 
stated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.64
The stated objective reason for New Haven’s race-based 
dispa rate-treatment in refusing to certify the firefighter promo-
tion exam results was the legitimate reason of avoiding dispa-
rate-impact lia bility. But as the majority held, no reasonable jury 
could find that there was a “substantial basis in evidence to find 
the tests inade quate.”65 That made any inquiry into actual subjec-
tive intent unne cessary.66 However, the dissent argued that the 
proper standard for resolving the objective question should be 
whether the evidence provided “good cause” for the City to fear 
disparate-impact liabil ity. Nevertheless, even the dissent would 
presumably concede the City’s disparate-treatment liability if 
the asserted disparate-impact concern were a mere pretext for 
intentional discrimination. As a result, the entry of summary 
judgment for the City by the lower courts could not be affirmed, 
because there was ample evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury 
to find that the City’s purported dispa rate-impact concern was 
Justice	Scalia,	alone	in	his	
concurring	opinion,	argued		
that	the	Court	would		
even	tually	have	to	decide	
whether	the	disparate-impact	
provision	of	Title	VII		
was	itself	unconstitutional	
as	a	violation	of	the	Equal	
Protection	principle.
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actually a pretext for political placation of an impor tant racial 
constituency.67
Justice Alito offered several reasons, including appease-
ment of an important black political leader in New Haven, for 
believing that such political placation was the City’s actual motive. 
The record dem onstrated that City officials worked behind the 
scenes to avoid cer tification of the exam results, because certifi-
cation would have antagonized the black political leader whom 
Mayor DeStefano did not wish to antagonize. This local black 
leader had strong personal and political ties with the seven-term 
Mayor that stretched back for more than a decade, and the Mayor 
had previously selected the black leader to serve as Chair of the 
New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners. While serving in that 
capac ity, the black leader once created a political flap by stating 
that certain new recruits would not be hired because “they just 
have too many vowels in their name[s].”68
The City’s political motives did not stop with placation. 
The record suggested that members of the Mayor’s staff had tried 
to orchestrate the city’s response to the promotion exam contro-
versy in part by silencing the City’s Fire Chief and Assistant Fire 
Chief, both of whom favored certifying the exam results. The 
record further suggested that the Mayor made up his mind to 
oppose certification of the exam results, but wanted to conceal 
that fact from the public. In addition, during the Civil Service 
Board meetings held to resolve the certification issue, local black 
leaders with strong ties to the Mayor’s office tried to exploit racial 
ten sions by threat ening ramifications if the exam results were 
certi fied. They also accused white firefighters of cheating on the 
exam, although those accusations turned out to be baseless. In 
addition, the City relied heavily on testimony of the competitor 
consultant who offered some criti cism of the exams, using him 
as a conduit for the Mayor’s political views. The city, as a reward 
for his assistance, ultimately hired the competitor consultant. The 
Mayor decided to overrule the Civil Service Board even if the 
Board decided to certify the exam results, and after certification 
failed by a 2–2 vote, the Mayor took credit for scuttling the exam 
results.
Justice Alito concluded that these facts provided ample 
basis for a reasonable juror to conclude that the City’s stated 
dispa rate-impact justification was simply pretex tual. He noted 
that even the United States Solicitor General con ceded that the 
lower courts did not give adequate consideration to the pretext 
possibility.69 Justice Alito emphasized that he was not simply 
equating po litical considerations with unlawful discrimination. 
However, he did be lieve that unlawful discrimination was not a 
permissible way to win over a political constituency.70
Even if the Mayor’s decision to overrule any adverse rul-
ing by the Civil Service Board were over looked, and even if the 
Civil Service Board were viewed as having made the final cer-
tification decision, the Mayor’s improperly motivated in fluence 
could still taint the Civil Service Board’s decision. Al though the 
Supreme Court under Title VII never resolved the question of 
improper influence on a decisionmaker, the courts of appeals 
applied a variety of standards to the ques tion. In Ricci, a reason-
able jury could find that those lower court stan dards were met in 
a way that impermissibly tainted the Civil Service Board decision 
not to certify the exam results. In any event, it was the politically 
predisposed Mayor, and not the Civil Service Board, who had 
final decisionmaking authority.71 The peti tioners—such as dys-
lexic Frank Ricci who had to hire someone at his own expense 
to pre pare for the exam, and Latino Benjamin Vargas who had to 
give up his part time job to prepare for the exam—deserved more 
than sympathy. They had a right to even handed enforcement of 
Title VII’s prohibition against racial dis crimination—a right that 
the City’s refusal to certify denied them.72
a. ThE liBERal Bloc—Justice Ginsburg’s 
Dissenting Opinion
The four Justices who joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent-
ing opinion in Ricci vote so consistently in favor of the minority 
inter ests presented in race cases that they have come to constitute 
a lib eral Supreme Court voting bloc on the issue of race.73 The 
mem bers of that voting bloc are Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg and Breyer. With only mi nor deviations, those four Justices 
have al most always voted to uphold the racial minority claims at 
issue in constitutional affirma tive action cases, majority-minority 
redi stricting cases, and racial integration cases while sitting on 
the Su preme Court.74
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New 
Haven did not violate Title VII by seeking to avoid the racially 
disparate impact of its firefighter promotion exam. Justice Gins-
burg emphasized that New Haven had a long history of racial 
dis crimination in its fire department, and although blacks and 
Latinos made up almost 60 percent of the City’s population, 
minorities were still rare in fire department command positions. 
She conceded that the white firefighters who scored well on the 
promotion exams “understand ably attract this Court’s sympathy,” 
but “they had no vested right to promotion.” In holding that the 
City lacked a “strong basis in evidence” for its decision not to 
certify the exam results, the ma jority pretended that the City was 
motivated only by race. However, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that there were mul tiple flaws in the exams that the City used, and 
that other cities used better selection procedures that yielded less 
racially skewed outcomes. One could not help but wonder why the 
City did not use one of the alternatives that would have produced 
less disparate results. Justice Gins burg stated that the majority 
“barely acknowledges the pathmark ing decision in Griggs,” and 
the centrality that the disparate-impact concept plays in Title VII 
enforcement. As a result, she believed that the majority’s decision 
in Ricci would not have staying power.75
Justice Ginsburg believed that the majority’s recitation 
of the facts omitted important details. Firefighting in general was 
associated with a long legacy of racial discrimination, which 
Congress recognized in 1972 when it extended Title VII coverage 
to state and municipal employ ment—where racial discrimination 
was even more prevalent than in the private sector. Employment 
decisions often abandoned merit in favor of nepotism or politi-
cal patronage, thereby entrenching preexisting racial hierarchies. 
New Haven illustrated the problem. In the early 1970s, minorities 
com prised 30% of the population, but only 3.6% of the City’s five 
hundred and two firefighters. Moreover, only one of the Depart-
ment’s one hundred and seven officers was a minority firefighter. 
It took a law suit and subsequent settlement before conditions in 
the New Haven fire department improved. However, by the time 
of the 2003 promotions at issue in Ricci, minorities still remained 
badly underrepresented in the senior officer ranks—where only 
one of the City’s twenty one fire cap tains was black.76
The City’s promotion exams produced the stark racial 
disparities that were at is sue in Ricci, where minority candidates 
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passed at about half the rate of blacks. In making its 2003 round 
of promotions, New Haven adhered to the testing regime outlined 
in the firefighters union contract that it had used for two decades, 
without closely considering what sort of practical examination 
would best measure fitness for promotion. Accordingly, when the 
City asked its consultant to de sign promotion exams, the consul-
tant was told to adhere to a 60% written component and a 40% 
oral component, with out ever considering other alternative selec-
tion regimes. Because those 50% racial disparities fell well below 
the 80% standard that the Equal Employment Oppor tunity Com-
mission used for Title VII enforcement, City officials were con-
cerned about the danger of incurring Title VII disparate-impact 
liability. As a result, the New Haven Civil Service Board held a 
series of public meetings designed to assess job-relatedness and 
the availability of less-discriminatory alternatives.77
At those meetings, some participants favored certifying 
the exam results, and some objected to certification. The evidence 
presented in favor of certification stressed the close relationship 
between the exams and the assigned study materials, as well as 
the consi derable time and expense that many applicants invested 
in pre paring for the exams. The evidence against certification 
included questions about the germaneness of the exam to New 
Haven prac tices and procedures, as well as racially-correlated 
un equal access to study materials that was traceable to the fact 
that white appli cants had relatives in the fire service from whom 
they could obtain materials and assistance.78
Other evidence showed that the nearby City of Bridge-
port previously used selection procedures similar to the proce-
dures used by New Haven, but reduced the racially-disparate 
impact of its selection process when it changed the relative 
weighting of its written and oral exams. The new weighting 
gave primary weight to the oral exam, which could better test 
responses to real-life scena rios. A competitor consultant stated 
that behavioral responses to hypothetical situations presented in 
“assessment centers” could test for pertinent skills—with less 
of a disparate impact—in a way that was more valid than mere 
written multiple choice exams. A Boston College professor of 
counseling psychology also noted that testing procedures such as 
those used by New Haven could have certain built-in biases that 
gave an advantage to white applicants. When the Civil Service 
Board’s 2–2 vote ultimately precluded certifica tion of the exam 
results, the two Board members who voted against certification 
stated that they did so because the evidence pre sented at the pub-
lic meetings convinced them that the exams were flawed, and that 
there were better alternatives.79
Justice Ginsburg noted that the disappointed firefighters 
who sued the City for failing to certify the exam results alleged 
that the City’s defense of trying to avoid a Title VII disparate-
impact vi olation was a mere pretext. However, when the District 
Court en tered summary judgment for the City, it merely followed 
Second Circuit precedent in holding that the intent to remedy 
disparate impact did not constitute intent to discriminate against 
nonminority applicants. The District Court also rejected the pre-
text argument, finding that the exam results were sufficiently 
skewed to make out a prima fa cie case of disparate-impact dis-
crimination, and that the City should not be forced to use racially 
skewed exam results that were presumptively invalid. Although 
the City was conscious of race, the District Court held that such 
race consciousness did not amount to racially disparate treatment. 
The City’s actions were race neutral in the sense that the exam 
results were discarded for all races, and the City’s actions were 
not analogous to a racial quo ta because everyone was treated uni-
formly without any individual preference. 80
Justice Ginsburg observed that when Title VII took effect 
in 1965, it did not create genuine equal opportunity, because sub-
tle and sometimes unconscious forms of discrimination simply 
re placed formerly undisguised discrimination. Accordingly, the 
Su preme Court’s 1971 unanimous decision in Griggs responded 
by holding that Title VII embodied a congressional intent to pro-
hibit discrimination through unintentional disparate impact—as 
well as through intentional disparate treatment—by focusing on 
the conse quences rather than the form of an employer’s actions. 
The Court’s 1975 unanimous decision in Albemarle	Paper then 
held that even a showing of job-related business necessity could 
not defeat a dispa rate-impact claim if the plaintiff could show the 
existence of an alternative job-related employment practice that 
had less of a ra cially disparate impact. Lower courts then began 
to enforce the Title VII disparate-impact provision in ways that 
invalidated em ployment practices, such as the firefighter promo-
tion exams at issue in Ricci, by carefully scrutinizing employer 
claims of business ne cessity. However, in its 1989 Wards	Cove 
decision, the Supreme Court began moving in a different direc-
tion. A bare majority of the Court adopted a new standard of 
proof for business necessity in Title VII disparate-impact cases 
that was more deferential to em ployers and less protective of 
employees seeking to avoid dis crimination. Congress responded 
to Wards	Cove, and other Su preme Court decisions that cut back 
on civil rights enforcement, by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which formally codified the disparate-impact reading of 
Title VII that was adopted in Griggs.81
Justice Ginsburg accused the majority of manufacturing 
a ten sion between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact 
provi sions of Title VII that simply did not exist. No previous 
Supreme Court decisions—including the now-discredited deci-
sion in Wards	 Cove—ever detected such a tension, and both 
provisions sought to promote the same objective of ending work-
place dis crimination by promoting genuine equal opportunity. 
Although the task of the Court should be to harmonize statutory 
provisions, the majority set the two provisions at odds with each 
other by charac terizing ac tions taken to avoid disparate-impact 
liability as actions taken “be cause of race.” By codifying Griggs 
and Albemarle	Pa	per, Con gress adopted a statutory design under 
which efforts to comply with the law by giving employees an 
equal opportunity to compete could not constitute a disparate-
treatment violation—subject to one condition. The employer 
taking a race-conscious remedial action must have “good cause” 
to believe that the racially disparate em ployment practice being 
remedied would not with stand scrutiny as a business necessity. 
Under the facts of Ricci, Justice Ginsburg thought that it was 
hard to see the “business ne cessity” for the par ticular exams and 
60/40 percent exam weight ings that the majority required the 
City to use.82
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Equal Employment 
Op portunity Commission interpretive guidelines, which were 
entitled to judicial deference, would not turn efforts to avoid 
disparate-impact liability into violations of the very statute with 
which those ef forts were designed to comply. She emphasized 
that the Su preme Court’s own gender discrimination precedent 
in Johnson	 v.	Transportation	Agency	 held that voluntary affir-
mative action programs for women did not violate the Title VII 
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disparate-treat ment provision. Although Ricci was not an affir-
mative action case, the New Haven effort to avoid actual dis-
crimination would cer tainly be likewise immune from Title VII 
disparate-treatment lia bility.83
Justice Ginsburg thought that the “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard that the majority invoked to resolve the statu-
tory tension it invented was too enigmatic. The standard was 
drawn from “inapposite equal protection precedents,” and was 
not elaborated upon. Equal Protection precedents were inappo-
site because—unlike Title VII—the Equal Protection Clause was 
interpreted by Personnel Administrator	v.	Feeney and Washington	
v.	Davis as not having a disparate-impact component.84 Prior to 
Ricci, the Supreme Court never questioned the constitutionality 
of Title VII’s disparate-im pact provision, because that provision 
“calls for a ‘race-neutral means to increase minority…participa-
tion’—something this Court’s equal protection precedents also 
encourage.”85 “[O]nly a very uncompromising court would issue 
such a decision.”86 Justice Ginsburg also thought that the cases 
on which the majority relied most heavily were particularly inapt, 
because they involved abso lute racial preferences. In contrast, 
an employer’s effort to avoid Title VII disparate-impact liability 
involved no racial preference at all, but rather, involved an effort 
to rely on job-related qualifica tions that do not screen out can-
didates of any race. Even Title VII race- and gender-conscious 
affirmative action cases used a reasonableness standard, rather 
than the majority’s new “strong basis in evidence” standard.87
Although a dominant theme of Title VII has been to 
encourage voluntary employer compliance, Justice Ginsburg 
believed that the majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard 
made voluntary compliance hazardous. Ricci illustrated that dis-
carding a dubious selection process would subject an employer to 
costly disparate-treatment litigation, in which the outcome would 
be very uncertain. Moreover, under the majority’s standard, 
the showing that an em ployer would have to make in order to 
avoid disparate-treatment liability was virtually the same as the 
showing that would be re quired to establish an actual disparate-
impact violation—thereby undermining an employer’s incentive 
to engage in voluntary Title VII compliance efforts. Even those 
Equal Protection affirmative action cases from which the major-
ity borrowed its “strong basis in evidence” standard did not apply 
that standard as harshly as the majority did in Ricci. Those cases 
never suggested that anything more than a prima facie case of 
prior discrimination would be re quired to permit the use of race-
conscious affirmative action reme dies.88
Justice Ginsburg found that the majority’s desire to pro-
tect the “legitimate expectations” of the disappointed firefighters 
who scored well on the promotion exams was circular, and she 
proposed her own “good cause” standard. If, as the City feared, 
the exam failed to constitute the least discriminatory means of 
testing for pertinent promotion qualities, the disappointed fire-
fighters could have no legitimate expectation of profiting from 
the results of the exams. That was especially true in Ricci, 
because the prime objective of Title VII was to prevent exclu-
sionary practices from freezing the status quo. In addition, Jus-
tice Ginsburg viewed as unfounded the majority’s suggestion that 
the “strong basis in evi dence” standard was necessary to avoid 
de facto quotas that were intended to promote an employer’s 
desired racial balance. Justice Ginsburg believed that her pro-
posed “good cause” standard would guard against racial balance 
quotas by ensuring the presence of a credible disparate impact 
claim. Justice Ginsburg also failed to understand why the major-
ity departed from customary practice by refusing to remand the 
Ricci case for District Court application of the new standard that 
the majority announced. The failure to remand also deprived 
the City of an opportunity to invoke the sta tutorily recog nized 
defense of good faith compliance with the in terpretive guidelines 
adopted by the Equal Employment Opportu nity Com mission.89
Justice Ginsburg outlined several factors showing that 
the City satisfied her “good cause” standard for assessing volun-
tary efforts to avoid disparate-impact liability. All agree that the 
New Haven promo tion exams had a sufficiently striking dispa-
rate impact to establish a prima facie case of Title VII liability. 
Moreover, the nature of the exams that established this disparate 
impact was suspect, because the City gave no consideration to 
anything other than its customary 60/40 percent weighting—
even though that weighting pro duced racially disparate results 
in the past. Reliance on written ex ams to assess practical skills is 
a questionable practice, because such exams do not necessarily 
identify leadership abilities. In fact, skepticism about the utility 
of such written exams has been ex pressed not only by experts 
who testified at the New Haven Civil Service Board meetings, 
but by other published experts, by courts, and by the Title VII 
administrative guidelines as well. Mere pencil-and-paper knowl-
edge of the history and vocabulary of baseball would not qualify 
one to play for the Boston Red Sox.90
Accordingly, it is not surprising that most municipal 
employers do not evaluate their promotion candidates through 
written tests or by giving tests the same weight as New Haven 
did. Two-thirds of the municipalities included in a 1996 study 
used assessment center simulations rather than written exams 
to evaluate candidates, and the popularity of assessment centers 
seems to be increasing over time. Among the municipalities that 
continue to use written exams, the median weight assigned to 
those exams is 30%—half the weight that New Haven assigned 
to its written exams. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that 
the prevalence of the assessment-center and modified-weighting 
alter natives would have made it difficult for New Haven to argue 
that its selection process was a business necessity. The major-
ity re jected these alternatives, asserting that assessment centers 
were unavailable in 2003, and that Title VII prohibited the racial 
ad justment of test scores. However, the only evidence in the 
record that supported the unavailability of assessment centers in 
2003 was an offhand remark made by Frank Ricci—one of the 
disappointed firefighters—which was belied by the widespread 
use of assess ment centers at the time in other municipalities. And 
changing the weight of the written and oral exams would not 
constitute a prohibited racial altera tion of test scores, but would 
rather consti tute the substitution of a new selection procedure. 
Justice Ginsburg thought that the major ity’s dismissal of any sub-
stantial risk of dis parate impact liability was reminiscent of the 
deferential standard accorded employers under Wards	Cove, but 
Wards	Cove was overruled by Con gress in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991—precisely because it was too protective of employers.91
Justice Ginsburg also found the New Haven exams 
ques tionable because the City precluded its consultant from get-
ting expert feedback on potential questions from anyone in the 
New Haven fire department. The restriction was intended to pro-
tect the secu rity of the exam questions, but this “very critical” 
defect re sulted in exam questions that were sometimes confus-
ing, irrele vant, spotty in their coverage, and potentially bi ased 
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in favor of nonminority firefighters. In addition, the exams had 
technical de fects that undermined the validity of the exam score 
cutoffs, and the ensuing candidate rankings. Although the major-
ity criticized the City for not requesting a technical report to allay 
its concerns about job relatedness, the technical report would 
merely have summarized evidence that was produced at the Civil 
Service Board meetings, and would not have established the 
relia bility of the exam as an assessment tool. The many defects 
contained in the exams created at least a triable issue of fact that 
precluded sum mary judgment against the City, even under the 
majority’s “strong basis in evidence” standard.92
In response to Justice Alito’s con curring opinion, Jus-
tice Ginsburg stated that she would not have opposed a remand 
to resolve the factual disputes revealed in the record, but the 
majority insisted on disposing of the case by sum mary judgment. 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion argued that the City’s as serted 
fear of disparate-impact liability was merely a pretext for the 
desire of certain officials in the mayor’s office to placate a politi-
cally powerful racial constituency, and that there was a sufficient 
fac tual dispute about this to vacate the lower court rulings of 
sum mary judgment for the City. Justice Ginsburg also noted that 
the facts on which Justice Alito drew to support his pretext claim 
were drawn from the self-serving statement of facts submitted 
by the petition ers. Moreover, many of those allegations were 
either misleading or entirely devoid of sup port in the record. The 
important point, how ever, was that the Civil Service Board—not 
the Mayor’s office—made the ultimate deci sion not to certify the 
exam results, and there was no evidence of political partisanship 
on the part of Civil Service Board members. In addition, the New 
Haven political forces favoring certification of the exam results 
attempted to exert just as much pressure on the Civil Service 
Board as did the politi cal forces opposing certifica tion.93
Justice Ginsburg went on to question the relevance of 
Justice Alito’s pretext argument, because political considerations 
alone could not be equated with unlawful discrimination. Politi-
cians commonly respond to racial considerations without engag-
ing in racial dis crimination. There is no reason to believe that the 
Mayor’s office wished to exclude white firefighters from promo-
tions, since white firefighters would also be promoted under a 
nondiscri mina tory selection procedure. The District Court found 
that the pres ence of political considerations did not negate the 
City’s ge nuine desire to avoid disparate-impact liability, and it 
found a total ab sence of discriminatory animus toward the peti-
tioners. Those findings were “entirely consistent with the record.” 
Moreo ver, as established by the Court’s recent post-9/11 racial 
profiling decision in Ashcroft	v.	Iqbal, a desire to please political 
constituents is not in consistent with a desire to avoid unlawful 
discrimination. 94
Jus tice Ginsburg concluded that the majority forced the 
City of New Haven to use a flawed promotion exam that would 
produce racially disparate results without identifying the best-
qualified can didates for promotion. The majority decision broke 
the promise of Griggs by denying equal opportunity through use 
of a test that was “fair in form, but discrimi natory in operation.”95
DOcTRINAL STRAIN
The outcome in Ricci did not flow naturally from pre-
existing Title VII doctrine. Rather, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion constructed a previously undetected tension between the 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII, 
and then resolved that tension in a way that strained against the 
overall anti discrimination ob jective that Title VII was enacted 
to advance. In addition, Justice Kennedy announced the Court’s 
modification of pre-existing Title VII doctrine in the process of 
granting summary judgment for the disappointed firefighter peti-
tioners, even though significant factual disputes almost certainly 
made summary judg ment for the petition ers improper. It appears 
that Justice Kennedy did both of these things knowingly, in order 
to convey the strength of the Court’s commitment to a new post-
racial conception of em ployment dis crimination law.
Title VIJustice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci 
adopted a novel reading of Title VII that rebalanced the compet-
ing interests be tween whites and racial minorities that are at stake 
in the allocation of limited societal resources. Moreover, it rebal-
anced those inter ests in a way that undermined the initial balance 
struck by Con gress in enacting and amending Title VII. The opin-
ion also failed to apply the standing limitations that the Supreme 
Court has in the past used to defeat minority claims of racial 
discrimination. In so doing, the Court yet again illustrated a will-
ingness to relax stand ing requirements for reverse discrimination 
claims asserted by whites that are strenuously enforced in cases 
asserting traditional discrimination against racial minorities.
1. Zero suM Balance
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that Ricci 
was a case of first impression concerning the divergence between 
the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII.96 But Justice Ginsburg’s dissent pointed out that no such con-
flict existed, because both provisions of Title VII were designed 
to ad vance the same goal—the elimination of employment prac-
tices that had commonly produced workplace discrimination in 
the past.97
In one sense, Justice Ginsburg was certainly correct. 
There was no conflict under pre-existing law, because pre-exist-
ing law held that the consideration of race for the sincere purpose 
of avoiding disparate impact discrimination did not constitute the 
type of racial consideration that could amount to a Title VII dis-
parate-treatment violation. That is what the District Court held 
when it followed Second Cir cuit precedent; that is what the Sec-
ond Cir cuit panel held when it summarily affirmed the District 
Court in its brief per curiam opi nion; that is what the full Second 
Circuit held when it denied re hearing en banc; that is what the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission es tablished when 
it adopted its Title VII interpre tive guidelines; and that is what 
the Supreme Court itself es tablished in an analogous gender 
dis crimination case holding that the consideration of gender to 
prevent disparate impact did not amount to a Title VII disparate-
treatment violation.98
But Justice Kennedy also had a point. Even though 
Title VII law was settled at the time of the Ricci decision, there 
had long been undercurrents of discontent with that settlement. 
Individual conservative-bloc Justices in prior Title VII cases 
expressed the view that racial affirmative action could not be 
used to benefit minorities who were not themselves actual victims 
of partic u la rized discrimination, because such affirmative action 
imposed too great a burden on adversely affected whites.99 As 
Justice Ken nedy stressed in his Ricci opinion, several Supreme 
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Court consti tutional decisions struggled with the issue of when 
the Equal Protection Clause permitted affirmative action pro-
grams to benefit minorities at the expense of so-called innocent 
whites.100 Accor dingly, what Justice Kennedy was really doing 
in Ricci when he detected and resolved a novel tension between 
the disparate-treat ment and disparate-impact provisions of Title 
VII was changing the balance that the Supreme Court previously 
struck between the zero-sum interests of whites and racial minor-
ities in discrimi nation cases.101
In any alleged race discrimination or affirmative action 
case, a contested societal resource—such as the right to a fire-
fighter pro motion—has to be allocated to either a white person or 
to a racial minority. In order to make that allocation, some way 
has to be found to balance the competing interests underlying 
the white and minority claims of entitlement to that resource. 
Previously, the bal ance was struck so that close cases would be 
resolved in favor of racial minorities, in order to compensate for 
past discrimination or to promote prospective diversity. Ricci, 
however, re-struck the balance so that close cases would now be 
resolved in favor of whites. It did this by increasing, to a “strong 
basis in evidence,” the standard of proof that had to be met before 
a resource could be given to a racial minority.102
In other words, the five-Justice Ricci majority re-struck 
the balance between white and minority interests in Title VII 
cases, so that the new balance would mirror the balance that the 
Supreme Court previously struck in its constitutional af firmative 
action cases. That might initially appear to create a desir able doc-
trinal symmetry, but there is an important asymmetry that exists 
between Title VII and constitutional cases. In Title VII cases the 
appropriate balance is supposed to be struck by Congress—not 
by the Supreme Court. It is true that statutes are often ambigu-
ous, and the exercise of loosely constrained judicial discretion 
is often required for the Supreme Court to announce statutory 
meaning. But that is not the case with the disparate-impact provi-
sion of Title VII.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Justice Kennedy was 
not writing on a clean slate when he chose to strike a new Title 
VII balance in favor of whites. The Supreme Court previously 
tried to strike a similar balance in Wards	Cove and other deci-
sions that cut back on civil rights enforcement. However, Con-
gress responded by over ruling those cases in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991.103 Therefore, when Justice Kennedy rewrote Title VII 
in Ricci to correspond to the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence, he was usurping legislative policymaking power 
from Congress. Congress wanted the close cases to be resolved 
in favor of racial minorities, believing that to be the best way 
of reducing employ ment dis crimination. But Justice Kennedy 
wanted the close cases to be re solved in favor of whites, even if 
it meant allowing fire department officers to remain overwhelm-
ingly white.
The Supreme Court’s usurpation of legislative racial 
policymaking power in Ricci may be difficult to justify in separa-
tion-of-powers terms, but it is hardly unprecedented. As a matter 
of relative institu tional competence, it is difficult to see why a 
politically insulated Supreme Court would view itself as better 
able than a politically accountable national legislature to balance 
the subtle and complex competing interests that are necessarily 
entailed in trying to for mulate a coherent national race relations 
policy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems always to have 
thought that it could do a better job than Congress in mediating 
the nation’s racial tensions. When the Court invalidated congres-
sional efforts to limit the spread of sla very in Dred	Scott	v.	San-
ford,104 Congress overruled that decision by securing the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to shift the pre-Civil War federalism balance in 
matters involving race from the states to the federal government, 
by giving Congress the power to enforce the equality and antidis-
crimination provisions of the Amendment.106 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court decision in the Civil	 Rights	 Cases107 re-struck 
that balance in favor of state sovereignty by read ing a “state 
action” component into the Fourteenth Amend ment, even though 
Section Five expressly gave Congress the power to enforce the 
Amendment.108 If judicial activism is defined as the disregard of 
clearly ex pressed legislative policy judgments, then Ricci entails 
an exercise in conservative judicial activism.
Justice Kennedy used the new “strong basis in evi-
dence” stan dard as the doctrinal device that would accord his 
desired addi tional weight to the interests of whites in the Title VII 
balance. Like the lower courts and the Solicitor General, Justice 
Ginsburg thought that that any genuine desire to avoid a dispa-
rate-impact violation would suffice to prevent a disparate-treat-
ment violation. She insisted only on the presence of “good cause” 
to fear a dispa rate-impact violation, as a safeguard against frivo-
lous or pretextual disparate-impact claims.109 Justice Ginsburg 
also emphasized that the heightened “strong basis in evidence” 
standard would frustrate the Title VII preference for voluntary 
compliance, by making it hazardous for employers to implement 
voluntary remedies for dis parate impact. Only a disparate-impact 
showing that was strong enough to establish an actual Title VII 
violation would be suffi cient to immunize employers from poten-
tial disparate-treatment violations.110
The law governing contract modifications, as well as the 
law of accord and satisfac tion governing the settlement of legal 
disputes, supports Justice Ginsburg’s view. Reminiscent of Jus-
tice Kennedy’s approach, classical contract law would not rec-
ognize the presence of consideration supporting a modification or 
accord and satisfaction unless the underlying relinquished claim 
was in fact a meritorious one.111 However, such a rule made vol-
untary modifications and settlements largely worthless, because 
the underlying legal claim would still have to be adjudicated in 
order to establish the validity of the modification or settlement. 
After realizing this, modern contract doctrine dispensed with the 
need to establish the validity of the underlying claim. It insisted 
only on “good faith” motivation, and it did so precisely so that 
voluntary modifications and settlements could become legally 
en forceable.112
Utilization of the “strong basis in evidence” standard, 
therefore, constitutes another impor tant way in which the Ricci 
majority undermined the thrust of Title VII—by frustrating the 
congressional desire to rely heavily on voluntary rather than 
coerced compliance. Justice Kennedy’s adoption of a “strong 
basis in evidence” standard thrusts Title VII voluntary compli-
ance back to the days of classical contract law, and in so doing, 
undermines the Title VII preference for voluntary compliance. 
Moreover, the “strong basis in evidence” standard seems to apply 
in a way that benefits whites more than it benefits racial minori-
ties. Although there is ample reason to find a “strong basis in 
evidence” support ing the City’s fear of disparate-impact liabil-
ity,113 there is not a “strong basis in evidence” for the Court to 
have rejected the as sessment-center and modified-weighting 
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alternatives that the city wished to use in lieu of its racially 
skewed written exams.114 It seems unlikely that the effect of Jus-
tice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard on voluntary 
settlements went unnoticed—or was unintended. Without volun-
tary compliance to supplement formal enforcement of Title VII, 
there will simply be fewer occasions in which contested resources 
are given to racial minorities rather than to whites.
The unequal application of discrimination law to whites 
and racial minorities is illustrated even more clearly by Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion. Although Justice Kennedy’s major-
ity opinion expressly left open the question of whether the Title 
VII disparate-impact provision was constitutional,115 Justice Sca-
lia apparently believed that the provision did violate the Equal 
Protection prin ciple of the Constitution by forcing employers to 
engage in race-based decisionmaking in order to avoid disparate 
impact.116 Justice Scalia then suggested that the disparate-impact 
provision of Title VII might be saved if it were viewed as an evi-
dentiary tool to “smoke out” intentional discrimination, but that 
such a saving con struction would require recognition of a good 
faith defense to any disparate-impact claim.117 This is striking 
because Justice Scalia also emphasized that a benign motive on 
the part of Congress in enacting the disparate-impact provision 
could not save the consti tutionality of the provision.118 This rea-
soning creates a curious form of discrimination. When Congress 
acts to remedy disparate-impact discrimination, a benign motive 
will not save the constitu tional validity of its actions.But when 
an employer acts to create dispa rate-impact discrimination, a 
benign motive will save the va lidity of the employer’s actions. 
For Justice Scalia, therefore, a good faith, benign motive can be 
used to permit racial discrimina tion, but not to prevent it. A legal 
regime that would permit such an out come is indeed a notewor-
thy regime.
Justice Alito too wrote a curious concurrence. By argu-
ing that New Haven’s asserted concern with disparate impact was 
really a politically motivated desire to placate a minority con-
stituency,119 Justice Alito appears to believe that racial politics is 
somehow ille gitimate. Although he concedes that racial consid-
erations can sometimes play a permissible role in political bar-
gaining, he says that racial discrimination never can.120 However, 
the issue to be decided was whether the City’s decision to forego 
certification of the firefighter promotion exam results constituted 
permissible ra cial consideration or impermissible racial discrim-
ination. Justice Alito apparently believed that the City’s actions 
constituted a mere pretext for impermissible discrimination,121 
but his reasoning was circular. The only evidence that Justice 
Alito offered to support his discrimination conclusion was that 
the City considered race.122
Justice Alito could not have been pleased by his per-
ception of racial politics in New Haven. One of the black lead-
ers, whom Justice Alito viewed as having been placated by the 
Mayor’s administration, once objected to hiring firefighters who 
“just have too many vowels in their name[s],”123 an apparent ref-
erence to New Haven’s long history of hiring white Italian fire-
fighters instead of blacks.124 This suggests that “racial placa tion” 
had long been the norm rather than the exception in New Ha ven 
politics. If such ubiquitous racial politics were now to be recon-
ceptualized as unlawful racial discrimination, it is noteworthy 
that Justice Alito wished to effect that reconceptualization when 
the long history of New Haven racial politics began to benefit 
racial minorities rather than whites. It also makes one wonder 
whether Justice Alito believes that he can realistically exclude 
his own ra cial considerations from the adjudicatory process in 
the way that he apparently believes they should be excluded from 
the political process.125
2. standing
Although no Justice mentioned it, the disappointed New 
Haven firefighter petitioners may have lacked standing to chal-
lenge the City’s failure to certify the promotion exam results. 
They may have lacked standing because none of the petitioners 
could be sure of receiving the promotions they sought, even if 
the exam re sults had been certified. Under the City’s “rule of 
three,” the City Charter required that civil service positions be 
filled from among the top three exam performers for each posi-
tion.126 However, we cannot tell which of the top three candi-
dates would have been cho sen for any position. There were eight 
lieutenant vacan cies, so only eight of the top ten candidates who 
qualified for “imme diate promotion” to lieutenant under the rule 
of three would ac tually be promoted. Furthermore, there were 
seven captain vacan cies, so only seven of the top nine candidates 
who qualified for “im mediate promotion” to captain would be 
promoted.127 Collectively, we cannot know which of the eigh-
teen petitioners would have re ceived the fifteen available promo-
tions, but we do know that three of the petitioners would not have 
received any of the promotions at all.128
It may seem silly, but under the Supreme Court’s stand-
ing juri sprudence, such uncertainty about whether a favorable 
ruling will actually redress a plaintiff ’s alleged injury can deprive 
that plain tiff of standing. Moreover, a plaintiff ’s failure to estab-
lish a redres sable injury is not merely a prudential impediment 
to standing, but rather can amount to a constitutional defect that 
de prives the Court of jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy 
pro vision of Article III.129 On occasion the Supreme Court 
has applied this particula rized redressability requirement with 
remarkable stringency. For example, it denied environmental 
plaintiffs standing to enforce certain financial incentive provi-
sions of the Endangered Species Act, because those incentives 
might not ultimately result in protec tion of the endangered spe-
cies at issue.130 It also denied other environmentalists standing 
to challenge mining, oil, and natural gas exploitation of federal 
lands, because the plaintiffs did not show with sufficient partic-
ularity that they would use the precise tracts of land that were 
being opened up for exploitation.131 It even denied indigents 
standing to challenge preferential “charity” tax status for hos-
pitals that refused to provide certain charitable medi cal care to 
indigents, because the hospitals might continue to deny such care 
even if they were denied preferential tax status.132 In Ri	cci, no 
petitioner could be certain that a favorable ruling would redress 
his or her injury, because no petitioner could be certain of getting 
a promotion. Indeed, three petitioners could be certain that they 
would not get a promotion, although we do not know which three 
petitioners they would be.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not always enforce 
its standing redressability requirement with such stringency. 
Some times the Court grants standing despite serious redressabil-
ity prob lems, as it did when it granted the State of Massachusetts 
standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
refusal to re gulate certain greenhouse gas emissions even though 
such regu lation was not guaranteed to reduce the global warming 
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injuries that the State al leged.133 Because the law of standing is in 
notorious disarray, it is not surprising that Supreme Court stand-
ing decisions are often dif ficult to reconcile.134 The problem is 
that there is one overriding principle that does seem to reconcile 
many of the Court’s standing cases. The law of standing often 
protects the interests of whites more than it protects the inter ests 
of racial minorities.135
In the 1984 case of Allen	 v.	Wright,136 the Supreme 
Court de nied standing to black parents who challenged the alleg-
edly unlaw ful grant of tax-exempt status to segregated private 
schools, be cause those schools might continue to deny admis-
sion to blacks even if the tax exempt status of the schools were 
revoked. In the 1975 case of Warth	 v.	 Seldin,137 the Supreme 
Court denied stand ing to black and Latino plaintiffs who chal-
lenged exclusionary zoning practices alleged to be intentionally 
discriminatory, because the low and moderate income housing 
developments that had sought zoning variances still might not 
ultimately be constructed even if the exclusionary zoning prac-
tices were invalidated. In four police and prosecutorial miscon-
duct cases decided between 1974 and 1983, the Supreme Court 
found that a lack of standing and other justiciability defects 
barred suits by black victims of al leg ed ly discriminatory police 
brutality and other official abuses, be cause prior official miscon-
duct was moot and the threat of future recur rences was too specu-
lative for injunctive relief to redress any cur rent injury.138
The Supreme Court has been fairly frequent in its denial 
of standing to minority plaintiffs who wished to challenge alleg-
edly discriminatory practices that harm racial minorities. How-
ever, the Court often grants standing in analogous cases to white 
plaintiffs who wish to challenge affirmative action or antidiscrim-
ination practices that benefit minorities. In Northeastern	Florida	
Chapter	 of	 the	 Associated	 General	 Contractors	 of	 America	 v.	
City	 of	 Jack	sonville,139 the Court granted standing to a white 
construction con tractor who challenged an affirmative action 
program designed to benefit minority contractors, even though 
the white contractor was unlikely to be awarded one of the con-
tracts at issue if the af firma tive action program were invalidated. 
Other Supreme Court cases have similarly granted standing to 
whites seeking to chal lenge af firmative action programs,140 or 
voter-redistricting pro grams de signed to benefit racial minori-
ties,141 without requiring the strong redressable injury showings 
that the Court has de manded of mi nority plaintiffs. Ricci is a 
case that falls on the per missive white-plaintiff side of the line. 
It tacitly recognizes the standing of at least three white plaintiffs 
to challenge an antidi scrimination law that benefits racial minori-
ties, even though they cannot possibly prove redressabiThe one 
final irony that should be noted in the Supreme Court’s tacit grant 
of standing to the Ricci plaintiffs is its effective issuance of an 
advisory opinion. The purpose of the Article III standing require-
ment is to help ensure that the federal courts do not issue advi-
sory opinions—opinions that make abstract pronouncements of 
law that are unnecessary to the resolu tion of a concrete “case” or 
“controversy” presented in an adver sary context.142 Because the 
Supreme Court disposed of the Ricci case by granting the motion 
for summary judgment filed by the peti tioners, the Court ended 
up making abstract pronouncements that were dependent on the 
resolution of factual issues that seem clearly to have been in dis-
pute. The Court even announced that minority firefighters could 
not win a hypothetical Title VII dispa rate-impact suit if they were 
subsequently to file one.143 Moreover, the Court did all of this 
without the vigorous adversary presenta tion that would have 
been available if the Court had followed the customary practice 
of remanding a case with contested facts for trial. The Court’s 
decision to grant the petitioners summary judg ment is therefore 
also quite curious.
SummaRy JudgmEnT
As Justice Kennedy noted, summary judgment is appro-
priate only where there is “no genuine issue as to any material 
fact,” and one party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”144 
His opi nion went on to hold that “there is no evidence—let alone 
the re quired strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed 
because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid 
and less discriminatory tests were available to the City.”145 The 
assertion that there is “no evidence” questioning job-relatedness 
or support ing the existence of less discriminatory alternatives is 
simply in correct. The assertion that there is no “strong basis in 
evidence” is the very legal issue that is under dispute.
1. no evidence
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that there was “no evidence” 
sup porting the City’s disparate impact fears does not withstand 
scru tiny. His opinion itself described evidence in the Civil Ser-
vice Board hearing record that both questioned the job-related-
ness of the City’s promotion exams and suggested the presence 
of less discriminatory alternatives. Some witnesses testified that 
the ex ams were outdated and not relevant to firefighting prac-
tices in New Haven.146 Others called for a validation study to 
determine job-relatedness, because the exams were “inherently 
unfair.”147 The competitor consultant testified that “assessment 
centers” were not only better at assessing job-relatedness, but 
that they would also constitute a less-discriminatory alternative 
selection device.148 A college professor with relevant expertise 
testified that the New Ha ven exams may have contained subtle 
racial biases that favored whites.149 The City’s legal counsel and 
officials in the Mayor’s administration also testified that there 
were less discriminatory alternatives to the exams.150
Justice Kennedy’s opinion ignored the additional perti-
nent evidence highlighted in Ginsburg’s dissent. She pointed to 
testimony establishing that most municipalities do not use pen-
cil-and-paper exams to evaluate promotion candidates because 
of questions about the sufficiency of those exams in assessing 
practical job-related skills. She also cited evidence in the record 
establishing that other municipalities use alternate weighting 
percentages that place more emphasis on prac tical skills than on 
written exam results.151 Far from containing “no evidence,” the 
record was replete with evidence of less discrimi natory alterna-
tives that posed fewer job-relatedness problems. Not only were 
alternate weightings of exam and practical skills a see mingly bet-
ter alternative, but the conclusion that assessment cen ters would 
have been a better alternative actually seems to have been uncon-
tested. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rejected these evidentiary 
showings out of hand.
Justice Kennedy rejected the alternate weighting option 
be cause he viewed it as prohibited by the New Haven firefighter 
un ion contract, the New Haven City Charter, and the Title VII 
prohi bition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race.” He 
also saw no evidence that the original New Haven exam weighting 
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was arbitrary.152 The union contract and City Charter were largely 
irrele vant, because they would simply be unlawful if they com-
pelled a degree of disparate impact that was prohibited by Title 
VII. Also, the fact that the original exam weighting may not have 
been arbitrary was simply nonresponsive to the claim that better 
alternatives existed. However, the question of whether alternate 
weightings would constitute prohibited race-based adjustment of 
test scores, as Justice Kennedy argued, or the mere substitution of 
an alternate selection procedure, as Justice Ginsburg argued,153 
is more serious. Ultimately, how ever, it simply begs the central 
question presented in the case. Proper legal characterization of a 
decision by the City to use an alternate weighting process would 
turn on whether the City was motivated by genuine disparate-
impact concerns when it declined to certify the exam results, or 
whether that decision was a mere pretext for racial bias. But the 
question of motive certainly seems like a disputed issue of fact 
that could have been better resolved by a trial on remand than by 
Justice Kennedy’s ex cathedra determi nation.154
Justice Kennedy rejected the assessment center alter-
native, even though no one seems to dispute the claim that 
assessment centers would have been more job-related and less 
discriminatory than written promotion exams. Justice Kennedy 
gave only one rea son for rejecting the assessment center alter-
native. He stated that assessment centers would not have been 
available for the 2003 firefighter promotions.155 However, that 
conclusion was based on a single offhand comment made by 
Frank Ricci—one of the very petitioners challenging the City’s 
failure to certify the exam results.156 Although Frank Ricci was a 
firefighter who worked hard to score well on his promotion exam, 
the record does not suggest that he had any expertise whatsoever 
in designing, im plementing, or evaluating promotion procedures. 
As Justice Gins burg pointed out, there was no particular reason to 
believe that as sessment centers—which were in widespread use 
in other municipalities at the time—were unavailable to the City 
of New Haven.157 Moreover, the record does not disclose any 
reason it was important for promotions to be made in 2003, rather 
than waiting until assessment center procedures could be estab-
lished. That is especially noteworthy since the Supreme Court 
did not fi nally order the promotion exam results to be certified 
until 2009. Although Justice Kennedy was unwilling to accord 
any deference to New Haven’s fear of potential disparate-impact 
liability, he was willing to accord total deference to Frank Ricci’s 
stated basis for opposition to assessment centers.
The racial politics of which Justice Alito apparently dis-
approved may well have been viewed by minorities as the only 
alternative available to counteract the more entrenched politics 
that had caused the City to use its de facto discriminatory promo-
tion procedures for the previous twenty years.158 In a political 
climate where a fire department would forego promotion assess-
ment alternatives that were more job-related and less discrimina-
tory than written multiple-choice exams, it is easy to understand 
how racial politics could become as salient as Justice Alito found 
them to be.159 Whether the City’s effort to deviate from its pre-
vious practices was genuine or pretextual seems at least to be 
a genuine issue of material fact. Justice Ginsburg notes that it 
is common practice for the Supreme Court to remand a case in 
which it has announced a new rule of law, so that the trial court 
can apply the new rule to the facts.160 That customary practice 
certainly seems compelling when factual disputes abound, as 
they did in Ricci, but it was not compelling enough to serve the 
purposes of the Ricci majority.
2. no strong Basis in evidence
Although it is difficult to defend Justice Kennedy’s 
assertion that there was “no evidence” of less discriminatory, 
job-related alternatives, Justice Kennedy also asserted that any 
evidence that might exist was not sufficient to satisfy the “strong 
basis in evi dence” standard that the Court was announcing as its 
new dispa rate-impact rule.161 It seems clear that there was sig-
nificant evi dence of less discriminatory, job-related alternatives 
contained in the Civil Service Board hearing record. It also seems 
clear that any suggestion that such alternatives were lacking was 
far from undis puted for summary judgment purposes. But Justice 
Kennedy knew all of this. My suspicion is that Justice Kennedy 
was not simply making an evidentiary or civil procedure mistake 
when he decided to enter summary judgment for the petitioners 
despite the existence of striking factual disputes. I suspect that 
Justice Kennedy was making a statement about the stringency of 
the new disparate-im pact rule that the Court was adopting.
By deeming a very strong factual showing of better 
alternatives to be insufficient even to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment, Justice Kennedy communicated that it would 
henceforth be very difficult to establish a disparate-impact dis-
crimination claim under Title VII, even when a prima facie case 
of disparate impact was statistically demonstrated. The Court 
was reinstituting an era of strong deference to employer dis-
cretion, in order to immun ize employers from disparate-impact 
claims. As Justice Ginsburg viewed it, the Court was reverting to 
the interpretation of Title VII that it had adopted in Wards	Cove, 
even though Congress had overruled Wards	 Cove by statutory 
amendment in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.162 I believe that Jus-
tice Kennedy was conveying the idea that disparate impact claims 
would now be as difficult to uphold under the Title VII “strong 
basis in evidence” standard as affirma tive action programs have 
been to uphold under the “strong ba sis in evidence” Equal Pro-
tection standard that Justice Kennedy borrowed.163
Since the conservative voting bloc took firm control of 
the Court in race cases after 1990, the Supreme Court has upheld 
the constitu tionality of a ra cial affirmative action program in only 
one case—and even that case seems doctrinally indistinguishable 
from another case in which the Court invalidated a similar pro-
gram on the same day.164 Justice Kennedy’s decision to grant the 
petitioners summary judgment in Ricci, despite the existence of 
important factual disputes suggests that we can expect outcomes 
in future Title VII disparate-impact cases that are similar to the 
out comes we have seen in affirmative action cases. Justice Ken-
nedy himself illustrates this with the “advisory opinion” that 
he issued to reject the hypothetical claim asserted by minority 
firefighters in the hy pothetical New Haven disparate-impact case 
that was never even filed.165 Even though such a hypothetical suit 
would be filed by different plaintiffs, using legal theories and evi-
dentiary presenta tions that had not yet been developed—let alone 
presented to a court—Justice Kennedy was still confident that 
the minority fire fighters would lose their case. He could not have 
known this unless he had already determined that the “strong basis 
in evidence” stan dard was so heavily tilted toward the interest of 
white firefighters that no hypothetical disparate impact would be 
sufficient to out weigh the harm to whites.166 This also suggests 
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that Justice Ginsburg was correct when she feared that Justice 
Ken nedy’s “strong basis in evidence” standard would undermine 
the congres sional preference for voluntary compliance with Title 
VII.167 For Justice Kennedy, there appears to be very little gap 
left to fill between potential liability (under the “strong basis in 
evidence” standard) and actual liability (under the statutory Title 
VII standard) for vo luntary compliance to fill. He appears to be 
equally solicitous of white interests under both standards.
The stringency of Justice Kennedy’s “strong basis in evi-
dence” standard means that the scales are tipped in Title VII cases 
before the Court even begins its analysis. Because the Court has 
now de tected a conflict between the sta tute’s dispa rate-treatment 
and dis parate-impact provisions, the Court must balance compet-
ing inter ests to resolve that conflict. The “strong basis in evi-
dence” stan dard means that when unclear or disputed evi dence 
is in equipoise, the balance will be struck in favor of pro tecting 
the white interest in avoiding disparate-treatment discrimi nation, 
ra ther than in favor of the racial minority interest in avoiding 
dispa rate-impact dis crimination. It is unclear why a tie should 
go to the white interests under a statute that was enacted to pre-
vent discrimination against racial minorities—unless the Court 
believes that times have changed so much that whites are now the 
primary victims of racial discrimination.
POSTRAcIAL DIScRIMINATION
Postracial discrimination is discrimination against racial 
mi norities that purports to be merely a ban on discrimination 
against whites. It is premised on the belief that active discrimi-
nation against racial minorities has largely ceased to exist, and 
that the lingering effects of past discrimination have now largely 
dissi pated. As a result, a prospective commitment to colorblind 
race neutrality is now sufficient to promote racial equality, and 
any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful 
dis crimination. Although versions of this view have been around 
since the era of official segregation,168 the claim that we now 
live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility 
from the success of prominent racial minorities in roles that were 
tradition ally reserved for whites. Those successes have ranged 
from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a 
traditionally white game,169 to the selec tion of black politician 
Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party,170 to the election 
of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.171
As recent events have indicated, however, the claim that 
we now live in a postracial society is quite premature. Black Har-
vard Professor Henry Louis Gates still believed that he was being 
ra cially profiled in 2009 when he was arrested by a white police 
of ficer after allegedly breaking into his own house.172 The subur-
ban Philadelphia Valley Swim Club still thought it was appropri-
ate to exclude black children from its swimming pool in 2009.173 
And the 2009 death of singer Michael Jackson reminded us that 
the “King of Pop” lived in a culture that caused him to think 
that he could increase his popular appeal by lightening the color 
of his skin.174 Because the culture that we live in is actually far 
from postracial in nature, supposed efforts to prevent whites from 
being victimized by racial minorities end up entailing nothing 
more than a new form of old fashioned discrimination.
The Supreme Court has played its part in this form of 
postra cial discrimination by inverting the traditional concepts of 
perpe trators and victims in a way that allows the Court ultimately 
to in vert the concepts of discrimination and equality themselves. 
Ricci serves as an example of such postracial discrimination, 
and other postracial discrimination decisions handed down by 
the Ro berts Court belie any suggestion that Ricci was merely an 
aberra tion. Moreover, the Roberts Court’s postracial discrimina-
tion deci sions are reminiscent of historical Supreme Court deci-
sions that were issued when the Court was openly hostile to racial 
minority rights, thereby further calling the legitimacy of those 
Roberts Court deci sions into question.
a. concEpTual invERSion
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Ricci dissent,175 
when the City of New Haven decided to forego reliance on the 
racially disparate results of its firefighter promotion exams, it was 
not act ing in a vacuum. Rather, the decision was part of the City’s 
effort to counteract a long history of racial employment discrimi-
nation practiced by the New Haven fire department. Historically, 
whites were the perpetrators of discriminatory hiring and promo-
tion decisions, and racial minorities were the victims.176 Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci inverted the concepts of per-
petrator and victim in a way that treated minorities as if they 
were the perpetrators and whites as if they were the victims.177 
Jus tice Alito’s concurring opinion was even more emphatic in 
its depic tion of whites as the victims of partisan racial poli-
tics in New Ha ven.178 The Court’s inver sion of the distinction 
between perpetra tors and victims has, in turn, prompted a more 
fundamental inver sion in the core concepts of discrimination and 
equality them selves, so that contemporary racial discrimi nation 
has now come to be viewed as equal, while remedial equality has 
come to be viewed as discriminatory.179
1. perpetrators and victiMs
In a zero-sum resource allocation context, the roles of 
perpe tra tor and victim can be initially assigned and subsequently 
in verted simply by shifting the ana lytical baseline that is used 
to conduct a discrimina tion analysis. A baseline is the thing that 
sepa rates the propositions that are actively addressed in formu-
lating an ana lyt i cal argument from the propositions that are sim-
ply assumed to be true without any effort to justify their validity. 
When analyti cal attention is focused on the issues that lie above 
the baseline, tacit assumptions that lie beneath the baseline often 
slip through unno ticed, and are passively accepted without any 
analytical justi fica tion. Indeed, baseline shifting works best as a 
persuasive tech nique when its baseline assumptions are able to 
do their work in a way that is largely undetected.180
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Ricci held that it 
was un fair to deny the disappointed petitioners the promotions to 
which they were entitled as a result of their superior performance 
on the written firefighter exams.181 That holding rested on the 
tacit base line assumption that those who perform well on pro-
motion exams are entitled to merit-based promotions. Therefore, 
the issue pre sented in Justice Kennedy’s opinion was whether a 
deviation from the merit-based promotions to which the petition-
ers were entitled was justified in order to advance the indepen-
dent goal of reducing the racially disparate impact produced by 
the promotion exams. Stated in this way, the claims of the disap-
pointed petitioners seem both strong and sympathetic, because it 
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is common to use promo tion exams for the purpose of assessing 
merit. As a result, the baseline assump tion—the assumption that 
those who scored well on their exams were entitled to promo-
tions—went largely unscru tinized. How ever, if the analytical 
baseline is shifted down, so that the baseline assumption is high-
lighted and actively scrutinized, the claim of the disappointed 
petitioners loses much of its force.
The assumption that the petitioners were entitled to pro-
motions because they had performed well on their written exams 
is not a valid assumption under Title VII. Title VII does not even 
require the use of written exams in awarding promotions. What 
Title VII does require is that promotions be awarded in a way that 
is not ra cially discriminatory, and disparate 
impact is an expressly prohi bited form of 
discrimination under Title VII. Accord-
ingly, even if the petitioners did perform 
well on their written exams, they still had 
no right to be promoted when their promo-
tions would produce a racially disparate 
impact. A non-validated promotion exam 
that produces a racially disparate impact is 
simply an unlawful em ployment practice—
especially in a case such as Ricci, where 
less-discriminatory, job-related alternatives 
exist.
The adoption of an analytical baseline necessarily 
entails a normative judgment. There is no “natural” baseline 
that can serve as the foundation for legal analysis, because the 
instrumental na ture of baselines means that they can always be 
contested by speci fying some different instrumental objective.182 
Justice Kennedy’s instrumental objective, reflected in the base-
line assumption un derlying his majority opinion, was to enforce 
the Title VII re quirement of race-neutral fairness to firefighters 
who performed well on their promotion exams.183 Justice Gins-
burg’s instrumental objective, reflected in 
the baseline assumption underlying her 
dis sent, was that Title VII requires an end 
to the historic practice of disparate-impact 
discrimination.184 There is no way to decide 
be tween these competing instrumental 
objectives without asserting a normative 
preference for one objective over the other. 
But the normative preference asserted 
by Justice Kennedy iIt seems reasonably 
clear that the enactment of Title VII’s pro-
hibitions on employment discrimination 
rested on the belief that racial and other 
minorities were the victims of widespread 
discri minatory practices being perpetrated 
against them by white em ployers and labor 
unions.185 The United States has had a long 
his tory of pervasive—and often violent—
white discrimination against racial minori-
ties, but racial discrimination against the white ma jority has 
never been a particular problem—at least not until now. Despite 
the racial history of the United States, Justice Kennedy chose to 
invert the Title VII concepts of perpetrators and victims, so that 
whites would be viewed as the victims in Ricci, and racial minori-
ties would be viewed as the perpetrators.186 There is nothing 
analyti cally impermissible about this doctrinal maneuver—the 
Le gal Realists have taught us that the job of lawyers and judges is 
to ma nipulate legal doctrine for instrumental purposes. However, 
one cannot help but wonder why Justice Kennedy and a majority 
of the Justices on the Supreme Court would view this inversion 
of the conventional Title VII understanding as nor matively desir-
able. It is likely that their actions in Ricci reflect a more funda-
mental inver sion of the concepts of discrimination and equality 
themselves.
2. discriMination and equality
The view that minorities have become the perpetrators 
and whites have become the victims of 
racial discrimination in the United States 
also inverts the conventional concepts of 
discrimina tion and equality by substituting 
for each the behavior and attitudes that we 
previously used to define the other. It used 
to be that the history of racial discrimina-
tion in the United States caused us to view 
existing distributional inequalities as the 
products of past and present discrimination, 
and to view racially redistributive efforts as 
remedial measures that were necessary to 
move us toward the goal of nondiscrimi-
natory equality. Now, however, we appear to view the existing 
racially-correlated distribution of resources as some thing that 
actually defines equality by honoring the individual dif ferences 
that exist between us, and we view racially-redistributive efforts 
as discriminatory rather than remedial. If there is no longer 
any appreciable level of discrimination against racial minori-
ties, race-conscious efforts to benefit racial minorities cannot be 
justi fied as remedial. Instead, they are simply a form of “reverse 
dis crimination,” that is inconsistent with the constitutional and 
statu tory principles of equality to which we 
claim an enduring com mitment. Inverting 
the concepts of discrimination and equality 
in this way might make sense if the United 
States is now a postracial culture, in which 
current racial equality has finally triumphed 
over our long history of prior inequality. If 
the United States has not yet achieved this 
postracial status, however, the con ceptual 
inversion simply becomes a new form of 
racial discrimina tion—one that insists on 
the preservation of existing inequalities in 
order to benefit whites.
It is hard to believe that someone 
could seriously contend that the problem of 
discrimination against racial minorities is 
a problem that is now behind us.187 Whites 
still have a significant advantage over racial 
minorities in the allocation of societal 
resources,188 and race obviously remains a salient social category 
that is often used to disadvantage minorities.189 However, the 
election of Barack Ob ama as President of the United States has 
nevertheless fueled cha racterization of the contemporary period 
as a postracial era in which minorities are able to compete suc-
cessfully against whites on a level playing field.190 Under this 
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view, the real racial problem in the Untied States is the problem 
of minorities discriminating against whites.
A pertinent Comment appeared in The New	 Yorker, 
shortly after the 2009 Cambridge police arrest of Harvard Pro-
fessor Henry Louis Gates in his own home.191Staff writer Kelefa 
Sanneh high lighted a number of ways in which minorities have 
been blamed for racist attitudes toward whites: Obama’s former 
pastor, Reve rend Jeremiah Wright, was called racist and anti-
white for his ser mons; Obama himself was accused of insulting 
white people when he referred to his grandmother as a “typi-
cal white person;” then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” 
remark was referred to as “racist;” and Obama’s claim that the 
Cambridge Police had “acted stupidly” in arresting Professor 
Gates was characterized as “racial self-aggrandizement,” which 
revealed a “deep-seated hatred for white people” that made 
Obama himself “a racist.”192 Even dis counting for the hyperbole 
that is often used to score rhetorical points, those accusations 
do seem to show that many whites have come to feel genuinely 
aggrieved by current racial politics.
Sanneh then went on to make an important point. He 
said that the accusations of “reverse racism” that are often used 
to combat affirmative action in the post-Civil Rights era have 
been so suc cessful that reverse racism against whites has now 
come to be viewed as systemic rather than personal. Whites like 
Frank Ricci do not simply feel that they are occasionally victim-
ized by the isolated deeds of bad actors. They feel as if the whole 
system is skewed in favor of racial minorities, and is therefore 
stacked against them.193 The irony here is striking. Title VII was 
rooted in the belief that racial equality could be achieved only 
by neutraliz ing the systemic discrimination that existed against 
racial minori ties, but the postracial Ricci view is that equality 
can be attained only by reinstituting the institutional practices 
that used to consti tute discrimination. Stated more concretely, 
under Title VII, a non-validated, multiple-choice exam that had 
a racially disparate impact used to be viewed as the very defini-
tion of systemic discrimina tion. Now reinstating the results of 
that exam is necessary to pre vent systemic discrimination against 
whites. Sanneh concluded that aggrieved whites have now com-
mandeered the term “racism”. Racial minorities can still talk 
about isolated issues that affect racial minority interests, but the 
term “racism” has now ac quired a cultural meaning that equates 
it with mistreatment of the white majority by racial minorities.194
The view that contemporary culture now entails this 
new form of systemic minority discrimination against whites, 
rather than the more traditional forms of white discrimination 
against minorities, would seem to be legally irrelevant even if 
true. The Supreme Court has insisted in its constitutional affir-
mative action decisions that the Equal Protection principle does 
not prohibit general “so cietal discrimination.” Particularized acts 
of identifiable discrimi nation are illegal, but the subtler forms 
of cultural behavior and attitudes that have systemically caused 
whites to do better than racial minorities in most social, politi-
cal and economic categories are not prohibited by the Court’s 
conception of Equal Protection.195 That Supreme Court holding 
has always been problematic,196 but it nevertheless remained the 
established law for as long as racial mi norities were the ones 
viewed as the victims of such societal discrimina tion. If the 
Supreme Court were to retreat from its refusal to recog nize the 
legal legitimacy of societal discrimination because it now viewed 
whites as the victims, the Supreme Court would be chang ing the 
rules in a racially motivated way. That would, of course, lend cre-
dence to the view that we continue to live in a cul ture that dis-
criminates against racial minorities.
The fact that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Ricci could be viewed as offering even a credible construction of 
Title VII shows that the Court’s inversion of the traditional dis-
crimination and equality concepts has a receptive audience. How-
ever, it is still diffi cult to take the postracial hypothesis on which 
that inver sion rests seriously. White discrimination against racial 
minorities remains a serious cultural problem, while minority 
discrimination against whites seems at best to be merely mar-
ginal. The continuing mal dis tri bu tion of societal resources along 
racial lines strongly rebuts the validity of any postracial-society 
claim that one might be in clined to assert. Minorities are dispro-
portionately burdened by high unemployment rates, high levels 
of poverty and low access to health care. Minority schools remain 
segregated and they offer educational opportunities that are sig-
nificantly worse than the op portunities offered in white schools. 
Minorities are still discrimi nated against in the job market, in real 
estate markets, and in con sumer transactions. Moreover, when 
minorities do get jobs they are paid less than whites with equiva-
lent levels of education. The bi ases that lead to these inequali-
ties are both conscious and uncons cious, and they show no signs 
of abating in the near future.197 Har vard sociologist William 
Julius Wilson has stated that we can not be considered a postra-
cial society as long as so many minorities are disproportionately 
concentrated at the low end of the socio-economic scale. When 
economic conditions dete riorate, minorities are always the ones 
who suffer as the targets of white frustra tions.198
It is true that the President of the United States is 
now black, but that does not mean that the society that elected 
him has become postracial. One could choose to character-
ize Obama’s election in different ways. One could characterize 
it as demonstrating that minorities can now com pete on a level 
playing field, without the need for affirmative action or serious 
antidiscri mination measures. Alternatively, one could character-
ize Obama’s election as de monstrat ing only that a mixed-race, 
multiple Ivy League graduate, with the intellectual and political 
skills to become President of the Harvard Law Review can suc-
cessfully navigate contem porary ra cial culture—thereby provid-
ing little evidence of how less-excep tional racial minority group 
members are likely to fare on a playing field that is far from 
level. As Professor Darren Hutchinson has noted, the “postracial” 
claim may simply illustrate the phenome non of “racial exhaus-
tion.” Whites have simply grown tired of having to deal with the 
discrimination claims asserted by racial minorities.199 As a result 
of this fatigue, whites may now have de cided to assert retaliatory 
discrimination claims of their own.
For me, the claim that our culture is now postracial is 
seriously undermined by the now-famous Henry Louis Gates 
arrest in 2009. Black Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates was 
arrested by white Cambridge Police Sergeant James Crowley 
after Professor Gates broke into his own home because the front 
door was stuck. A neighbor who feared that a criminal might be 
breaking into the house called the police. The events that fol-
lowed are dis puted, but Professor Gates ended up accusing Ser-
geant Crowley of racial profiling, and Sergeant Crowley ended up 
arresting Profes sor Gates. Because Sergeant Crowley knew that 
Professor Gates lived in the house at the time that the arrest was 
made, President Obama stated in response to a news conference 
42	 The Modern AMericAn
question that the police had “acted stupidly”—a comment that he 
later “recali brated.” These events attracted an enormous amount 
of media at tention, and things ultimately calmed down after Ser-
geant Crow ley, Professor Gates and President Obama all met for 
a beer to gether at the White House.200 I do not know what actu-
ally hap pened. I suspect that all parties probably “overreacted” 
in some sense, but that is my point. Racial tensions are still so 
high in even a northeastern university community that what 
might have been an innocuous non-event became a hot-button 
racial issue. Sergeant Crowley may well have thought that he was 
being ver bally abused simply for doing his job, and Professor 
Gates may well have thought that he was being arrested for act-
ing like an uppity nigger. An environment in which racial nerves 
are still that raw can hardly be viewed as an environment that is 
postracial.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the claim that we 
now live in a postracial society—a society where our most press-
ing dis crimination problem is the problem of racial discrimina-
tion against the white majority—comes from the Supreme Court 
itself. The current Supreme Court commonly rules in favor of 
whites and against racial minorities in contemporary race cases. 
Moreover, it rules this way even though it has had to strain prior 
antidiscrimi nation doctrine to do so. When the Supreme Court 
goes out of its way to favor white interests over the interests of 
racial minorities, the culture in which that Court operates can 
hardly be said to be postracial in any meaningful sense of the 
term. The Supreme Court favored the interests of whites over the 
interests of racial minorities in Ricci, and it has done so in a 
host of other race cases as well. When viewed in the context of 
these collective racial decisions, the Supreme Court emerges as 
an institution that facilitates discrimi nation against racial minori-
ties rather than an institution that pro motes equality.
B. conTExT
The Ricci decision did not occur in isolation. It was a 
5–4 deci sion handed down by the conservative voting bloc of 
the Roberts Court, which in its brief history has already issued 
a number of decisions that favored the interests of whites over 
the interests of racial minorities. Some of those decisions were 
issued the same Term as Ricci, and some were issued in prior 
Terms. But the racial tenor of all those decisions suggests a gen-
eral hostility to the en forcement of antidiscrimination laws and 
precedents that were in itially adopted to protect the interests of 
racial minorities from continued oppression by whites. Unfortu-
nately, the racial tenor of those Roberts Court decisions is also 
reminiscent of decisions is sued by the Supreme Court in earlier 
eras, when the Court was openly antagonistic to the rights of 
racial minorities. Consistent with the theory of postracial dis-
crimination, what emerges from the Roberts Court decisions is 
a Supreme Court that views its function to be that of protecting 
the white majority from discrimination claims asserted by racial 
minorities.
1. roBerts court discriMination
John Roberts was confirmed as Chief Justice of the 
United States in 2005.201 Since his confirmation, the Roberts 
Supreme Court has issued decisions that favored the interests 
of whites over the interests of racial minorities in a number of 
cases. In addition to Ricci, those cases include decisions that 
have rejected minority allegations of racial discrimination in the 
areas of voting rights, racial profiling, English language educa-
tion, and school resegrega tion.
a. Voting Rights.
Ricci was probably the most significant race case that 
the Ro berts Court decided during its 2008 Term, but another 
closely watched case was Northwest	 Austin	 Municipal	 Util-
ity	District	Number	One	v.	Holder.202 In Northwest	Austin, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 remained constitutional in light of the 
increased minority voting participation that has occurred since 
1965. Section 5 seeks to prevent future voting discrimination 
against racial mi norities by requiring jurisdictions with a history 
of prior voting discrimination to obtain federal preclearance from 
the Department of Justice or from a three-judge Federal District 
Court in the Dis trict of Columbia for any changes that they wish 
to make in their voting practices or procedures. In 2006, Con-
gress voted over whelmingly to reauthorize Section 5 for another 
twenty five years. This was the fourth time the Act had been 
reauthorized by Congress since 1965. However, the plaintiff util-
ity district argued that Sec tion 5 could not constitutionally be 
applied to it because there was no evidence that the utility district 
had ever engaged in voting dis crimination. A three-judge district 
court rejected the claim, but the Supreme Court avoided the con-
stitutional question by holding that the utility district could apply 
for a Section 5 waiver under the statute’s “bailout” provision.203
It might at first seem as if Northwest	Austin was decided 
in a way that was favorable to the interest of racial minority vot-
ers, because the Court declined to hold Section 5 unconstitu-
tional.204 However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts 
left little doubt that he believed Section 5 to be unconstitutional 
in light of the increased minority participation in voting that 
occurred since the original adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 
1965. Dis cussing two potentially applicable constitutional stan-
dards, he con cluded that “[t]he Act’s preclearance requirements 
and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions 
under either test.”205
Northwest	 Austin and Ricci are alike in at least two 
important respects. First, in both cases the Court practiced pos-
tracial dis crimination by supplanting an unambiguous statutory 
effort to protect racial minorities with a dubious judicial effort 
to protect whites.206 In Northwest	Austin, Congress decided as 
recently as 2006 that minority voters still needed the voting 
rights protec tions of Section 5. It did so by a vote of 390-33 in 
the House and 98-0 in the Senate, after extensive legislative hear-
ings, and a vo luminous legislative record.207 In Ricci, Congress 
not only adopted Title VII in 1964 to protect racial minorities 
from employment discrimination at the hands of whites, but it 
amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to 
overrule prior Supreme Court decisions that proved excessively 
protective of white em ployer interests, and insufficiently protec-
tive of racial minority rights.208 Both cases, therefore, illustrate 
the Court’s propensity to undermine congressional antidiscrimi-
nation initiatives when the Court disagrees with the racial poli-
cies that they embody.
Second, both Northwest	 Austin and Ricci sought to 
engage in racial policymaking through the technique of regula-
tory “chill,” rather than through the process of direct adjudication. 
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Because the race relations issues that underlie the Voting Rights 
Act and Title VII are pure legislative policy issues, the Supreme 
Court was understandably reluctant to invalidate the two statutes 
di rectly. To have done so would have subjected the Court to a 
po tential political backlash, and to questions about the Court’s 
usur pation of legislative policymaking powers in a way that was 
incon sistent with separation of powers principles. In both cases, 
what the Court did instead was to issue in	terrorem dicta that was 
designed to advance the Court’s postracial policy agenda with-
out forcing the Court to internalize the attendant political costs. 
Therefore, in Northwest	Austin, the Court threatened to hold Sec-
tion 5 uncons titutional in the future, so that Congress might be 
chilled into adopting “saving” modifications of the statute that 
better protected the interests of the Court’s white constituents.209 
Similarly, in Ricci, the Court tacitly threatened to hold Title VII 
unconstitutional in the future, so that Congress might be chilled 
from once again overruling by statute the Court’s postracial 
administration of Title VII.210
It is not clear how successful these dictum threats will 
prove to be, but they will almost certainly contribute to a political 
climate in which the representative branches will have to con-
sider rejuve nated reverse discrimination claims that are asserted 
by whites. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in the 
voting rights context. If the Northwest	Austin decision causes 
the upcoming 2010 census to be followed by a plethora of Vot-
ing Rights Act redistricting challenges such as those that arose 
after the 1990 cen sus,211 racial minorities are likely to end up 
suffering new forms of vote dilution. After the 1990 census, the 
Justice Depart ment was able to negotiate redistricting plans that 
did not unduly dilute mi nority voting strength by threatening to 
withhold Section 5 pre clearance under the Voting Rights Act.212 
Now, however, the Su preme Court decision in Northwest	Austin 
may not only encour age whites to file redistricting challenges to 
efforts aimed at pro tecting minority voting strength, but it may 
also reduce the Justice De partment’s negotiating leverage to 
resist such challenges. If a cov ered jurisdiction wishes to engage 
in redistricting that will in crease relative white voting strength, 
by diluting minority voting strength, that jurisdiction can simply 
thumb its nose at Justice De partment threats to deny preclear-
ance. Defiant jurisdictions will now have every incentive to risk 
litigation, gambling that the Su preme Court will simply declare 
Section 5 to be unconstitutional the next time a Section 5 chal-
lenge is presented to the Court.
The Roberts Court also decided a second voting rights 
case during its 2008 Term. Bartlett	v.	Strickland,213 was itself a 
redis trict ing case, in which the conservative bloc held 5–4 that 
the Voting Rights Act prohibitions on minority vote dilution did 
not apply to so-called “crossover districts.” A crossover district 
is a district in which minorities do not comprise a majority of 
the vot ing population, but comprise a large enough percentage to 
elect a candidate of their choice by forming political coalitions 
with whites. The issue presented was whether splitting a cross-
over district in a way that deprived its minority voters of a realis-
tic chance to elect the candidate of their choice constituted vote 
dilution of minority voting strength that was prohibited by the 
Voting Rights Act.214 In announcing the judgment of the Court, 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion held that splitting the district 
did not violate the Voting Rights Act, because minorities had to 
comprise at least 50% of the voting population in a district in 
order to qualify for vote dilution protection under the Act.215
Justice Souter’s dissent not only disagreed with the 50% 
requirement, but argued that reading such a requirement into the 
Act perversely encouraged racial bloc voting rather than inter-
racial voting coalitions. Justice Souter believed that the majority 
pro vided an incentive for states to pack minority voters into fewer 
majority-minority voting districts. It also punished minorities 
who were able to form voting coalitions with whites, by denying 
them statutory protections from vote dilution.216 Justice Souter 
stressed that minority vote dilution could be accomplished not 
merely by minority vote dispersion, but also by the very minority 
vote pack ing that the Court’s holding encouraged.217
Although the Bartlett decision is in many respects tech-
nical, the ultimate effect of the decision is to increase white vot-
ing strength by decreasing minority voting strength. By denying 
stat u tory vote dilution protections to crossover districts, minori-
ties will have less influence in the electoral process than they 
would have had if crossover districts were protected, because 
minorities will be able to control the electoral outcome in fewer 
voting dis tricts. Once again, Justice Kennedy’s opinion argued 
that granting vote dilution protections to racial minorities that 
white voters did not have would discriminate against whites.218 
As in Ricci, he indi cated that reading the statute to compel such 
racial considerations might make the statute unconstitutional.219 
Also reminiscent of Ricci, he viewed the society as postracial, 
because the existence of crossover districts now showed that the 
Voting Rights Act had “by definition” been successful in reduc-
ing racial discrimination in voting.220 But as in Ricci as well, 
Justice Kennedy’s postracial opin ion seems to ignore the fact that 
it is racial minorities rather than whites who suffer the types of 
historical discrimination that the pertinent statutes were intended 
to remedy.221
b. Racial Profiling.
The Roberts Court conservative bloc issued another 
5–4 deci sion during its 2008 Term in the racial profiling case of 
Ashcroft	v.	Iqbal.222 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
held that a Pakistani Muslim immigrant who was detained after 
the Sep tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not adequately state 
a cause of action when he claimed that high level Justice Depart-
ment offi cials, including the Attorney General and the Director of 
the FBI, singled him out for “harsh confinement” because of his 
reli gion and ethnicity.223 Iqbal’s complaint alleged that the defen-
dants “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh treatment, and that they did so 
“as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, 
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological inter-
est.” The complaint further alleged that the Attorney General was 
the “principal archi tect” of the policy, and the FBI Director was 
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementa-
tion.”224 Although the lower courts upheld the adequacy of the 
complaint,225 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that the allegations 
in the complaint were too conclusory and insufficiently plausible. 
They were too con clusory because they did not contain specific 
factual allegations, but rather were nothing more than “a ‘formu-
laic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination 
claim.”226 They were insufficiently plausible because there were 
legitimate, nondi scri minatory reasons why law enforcement offi-
cials would have fo cused on Arab Muslims following a terrorist 
attack by Arab Mus lim hijackers.227 Moreover, because the high 
level Justice De part ment officials were not subject to vicarious 
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liability, any plausible misconduct by lower level officials would 
not prevent dismissal of Iqbal’s complaint against the high level 
officials.228
The Iqbal Court’s dissatisfaction with “conclusory” 
pleadings, and its insistence on a stringent “plausibility” stan-
dard, seem in consistent with the idea of notice pleading that was 
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.229 The 
Court, however, also held “implausible” an Arab Muslim’s alle-
gation that discrimina tory racial profiling caused him to be tar-
geted for post-9-11 harsh confinement. To me, it is the Court’s 
holding that seems “im plausible.” Given the nation’s current 
anxieties and fears about Arab and Muslim terrorism, and the 
alleged involvement of high level federal officials in formulat-
ing United States torture pol icy,230 racial profiling seems more 
likely than not. As in Ricci, how ever, Justice Kennedy once again 
gave the benefit of the doubt to white claims of legitimacy rather 
than to racial minority claims of discrimination. As in Ricci, Jus-
tice Kennedy seemed intent on precluding any opportunity for 
an inquiry into the actual facts—entering summary judgment in 
Ricci and dismissing the complaint in Iqbal. And as in Ricci, Jus-
tice Kennedy had to strain the mean ing of existing law in order 
effectuate his inversion of the perpe trators and the victims.
c. English Language Education.
Yet another Roberts Court 2008 Term decision that 
disadvan taged racial minorities was Horne	 v.	 Flores.231 In an 
opinion by Justice Alito, the conservative bloc voted 5–4 to 
reverse the Dis trict Court and Court of Appeals holdings that Ari-
zona was violat ing the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
1974 by failing to provide adequate educational opportunities for 
students with lim i ted English language proficiency. The Equal 
Educational Op por tunities Act is an antidiscrimination statute 
that prohibits the denial of “equal educational opportunity on 
account of race, color, sex or national origin.” It further prohibits 
“the failure by an edu cational agency to take appropriate action 
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by 
its students in its in structional programs.”232 In 1992, the plain-
tiffs filed a class action challenging the State’s alleged failure to 
provide adequate educa tional oppor tunities for minority at-risk 
and limited English profi cient children. Beginning in 2000, the 
lower courts began issuing a series of or ders that required the 
adoption of minimal educational standards and increased funding 
to comply with the Act. The State’s repeated failures to comply 
ultimately led to contempt cita tions. The lower courts also denied 
the State’s Rule 60(b)(5) mo tion for relief from the compliance 
order, which the State argued had become inequitable in light of 
changed circumstances.233
Justice Alito’s opinion reversed, stating that the lower 
courts should have been more flexible in ruling on the Rule 60(b)
(5) mo tion, because such motions perform a particularly impor-
tant func tion in “institutional reform litigation” where “sensi-
tive federalism concerns” are involved.234 Here the lower courts 
had been insuffi ciently flexible, because they focused too much 
attention on whether the prior funding orders had been com-
plied with, and not enough at tention on the question of whether 
changed circum stances brought the State into compliance with 
the Act in a way that made enforcement of the original order 
inequitable.235 Justice Alito there fore stated that a remand was 
necessary to de termine if changed circumstances were pro-
vided by factors in cluding new educational strategies adopted 
by the State, and con gressional enactment of the No Child Left 
Behind statute.236 Jus tice Breyer’s dissent argued that the lower 
courts adequately considered the factors relevant to a changed-
circumstances inquiry, and that adequate funding was essential 
to compliance with the Act.237 Justice Breyer concluded that the 
Court’s decision would hinder congressional efforts to ensure 
that Spanish-speaking stu dents will learn the English skills nec-
essary to participate in a so ciety where English is the predomi-
nant language.238
Commentators have viewed Horne as establishing a new 
Rule 60(B)(5) standard for relief from court orders in institu-
tional liti gation that will undermine finality by permitting liti-
gants to reopen remedial injunctions that have been issued to 
control their con duct.239 For present purposes, however, Justice 
Breyer’s concern that the decision will frustrate congressio-
nal efforts to provide equal educational opportunities to Span-
ish-speaking minorities is particularly pertinent. Among the 
allegations made by the plaintiffs was the claim that Arizona’s 
school finance scheme “is just suffi cient to let less distressed, 
predominantly Anglo districts impart State-mandated essential 
skills to their mainstream student bodies” without providing suf-
ficient funds for minority students to acquire the same skills.240 
Although this claim was first asserted in 1992, by 2009 the plain-
tiffs had still not received the relief they re quested. Despite lower 
court decisions and contempt citations or dering such relief, the 
Roberts Court simply remanded for yet another round of pro-
ceeding. Moreover, it did so in an opinion whose tone suggested 
that the Court disfavored granting any relief. Consistent with its 
postracial orientation, the Roberts Court again appears to believe 
that there is no longer any real discrimination problem to remedy, 
and that racial minorities are simply asking for more than they 
are entitled to receive. And again, it adopted this position despite 
the existence of a federal statute that seems de signed to remedy 
the precise problem of which the plaintiffs com plained.
d. Resegregation.
In its 2006 Term, the conservative bloc of the Rob-
erts Court is sued a 5–4 decision in the school Resegregation	
Cases.241 The ma jority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts 
invalidated vol un tary race-conscious efforts by the Seattle and 
Louisville school boards to prevent the resegregation of pub-
lic schools that was oc curring as a result of residential reseg-
regation.242 In previous years, both school districts eventually 
achieved integration after making stren uous efforts to comply 
with the Supreme Court deci sions in Brown.243 When population 
shifts began to produce resegre gation, the school boards became 
convinced that only race conscious stu dent assignment could 
preserve the integrated nature of the schools. Accordingly both 
school boards adopted narrow integra tion plans, affecting a small 
number of students, that consid ered race when a student’s desired 
school assignment would force a school’s racial makeup to fall 
outside of a predetermined integra tion range.244 White parents 
who did not receive their desired school assignments challenged 
the plans. 245 The Court then re versed the lower courts and held 
the plans to be unconstitutional because they were not narrowly 
tailored to advance the interest of the schools in promoting stu-
dent diversity.246
Although Brown was issued to desegregate public 
schools, Chief Justice Roberts read the Brown decision itself as 
invalidating the integration plans that were adopted to prevent 
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resegregation.247 He justified this conclusion by asserting that a 
school board was prohibited from considering race regardless of 
its benign motive.248 He concluded his opinion by stating that 
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discrimi nating on the basis of race.”249 Justice Breyer’s dissent 
argued that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with Brown, 
and with a range of other Supreme Court precedents. He stressed 
that because other race neu tral ways of addressing the problem 
proved inade quate, the Court’s decision left school districts with 
no effective way to pre vent resegregation.250
The Court’s decision in the Resegregation	Cases seems 
to epitomize the conceptual inversion of discrimination and 
equality that animates the Court’s postracial view of contempo-
rary cul ture.251 When the decision in the Resegregation	Cases is 
juxta posed to the 5–4 conservative bloc decision in 2009, denying 
a black defendant post-conviction access to evidence for DNA 
test ing,252 it appears that white parents have a stronger constitu-
tional right to send their children to segregated schools than post-
convic tion criminal defendants have to test the evidence offered 
against them in a way that could establish their innocence. It takes 
quite a stretch of the legal imagination to 
conclude that Brown	v.	Board	of	Educa-
tion requires the resegrega tion of public 
schools. Yet the aphorism with which 
Chief Justice Roberts ends his Resegrega-
tion opinion attests to his possession of 
such an im agination. The Chief Justice, 
and the other members of the Su preme 
Court conservative voting bloc on race, 
appear to be lieve that the nation’s racial 
prob lems can be solved by a mere commit-
ment to prospective race neutrality. The 
Roberts Court’s recent race decisions turn 
a blind eye to the continuing ef fects of 
prior discrimination, and to the structural 
forces that con tinue to perpetuate subtle forms of institutional 
discrimination. In cases ranging from firefighter pro motions to 
school resegregation, the Court seems to care very little about the 
interests of racial mi nori ties—and very much about the interests 
of the white majority. In equalities suffered by racial mi norities 
simply do not seem to count when the Court submits to the lure 
of postracial discrimina tion. Unfortunately, this aligns the Rob-
erts Court with prior Su preme Courts that were more transpa-
rently committed to the prac tice of racial minority oppression.
2. Historical discriMination
The postracial discriminatory decisions of the Rob-
erts Court are reminiscent of the overt discriminatory decisions 
issued by prior Supreme Courts. There is now a fairly stan-
dard litany of in famous decisions in which historical Supreme 
Courts have openly sacrificed the interests of racial minorities to 
advance the interests of white slave holders, segregationists, and 
other white suprema cists. Traces of those historical decisions can 
also be found in more re cent contemporary cases, including those 
that have imposed con stitutional limits on school desegregation, 
racial redistricting, and racial affirmative action. The Roberts 
Court’s postra cial discrimi nation cases can be easily aligned with 
those prior de cisions, in terms of both tone and out come. Accord-
ingly, one can not help but wonder why the Roberts Court has not 
felt a need to dis tance itself from those historical and contempo-
rary decisions, ra ther than risk being aligned with them. I fear 
that the reason may be that the con servative bloc Justices on the 
Roberts Court actually favor such an alignment.
The historical Supreme Court was no friend to racial 
minori ties. In the 1823 case of Johnson	 v.	 McIntosh,253 the 
Supreme Court upheld the seizure of indigenous Indian lands by 
the United States. In the 1857 case of Dred	Scott	v.	Sanford,254 
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Missouri Compro-
mise Act of 1820, which Congress enacted in an effort to limit 
the spread of slav ery in new United States territories. The Court 
not only held that the statute interfered with the property rights 
of white slave own ers, but it also held that blacks could not be 
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution.255 
The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred	 Scott256 after the 
Civil War, when other Reconstruction constitutional amendments 
and implementing legislation were also enacted to promote equal 
rights for former black slaves. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
began limiting the re medial scope of the amendments, and even 
invalidated some of their implementing legislation.257 In the 1896 
case of Plessy	v.	Fer	guson,258 the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutional ity of Jim 
Crow official segregation in public facili-
ties. Despite some formal minority victo-
ries, the Court commonly capitulated to 
South ern white supremacist attitudes. It 
acquiesced to Southern eva sion efforts to 
deny blacks the right to vote, to replace 
slavery with peonage, to preserve seg-
regated transportation, and to preserve 
housing segregation.259 The Court also 
often capitulated to South ern racism in 
the criminal justice system by permitting 
racial se gregation in the jury box and on 
the witness stand. It sometimes allowed 
apparently innocent black defendants to be imprisoned or even 
executed, rather than interfere with the procedural sov er eignty of 
Southern state courts.260
In the mid-Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court’s 
racial per for mance was little better. In the 1944 case of Kore-
matsu	v.	United	States,261 the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a World War II order excluding Japanese-American citizens 
from their own homes on the West Coast, which led to the intern-
ment of Japanese-Ameri cans in detention centers. After the offi-
cial segregation doctrine of Plessy was invalidated by the 1954 
Brown school desegregation case,262 the Court still refused 
to order immediate desegregation. Instead, Brown	 II required 
desegregation “with all deliberate speed,” which permitted 
Brown to be evaded by massive Southern resistance for nearly 
a dec ade.263 Then, when the school desegrega tion effort moved 
out of the South, the Court articulated a distinc tion between de 
facto and de jure discrimination—a distinction that has permitted 
most schools in the United States to remain de facto segregated 
even today.264 The year after Brown was decided, the Su preme 
Court also declined to inva lidate a Virginia miscegena tion statute 
in Naim	v.	Naim,265 even though Brown almost certainly rendered 
the statute unconstitu tional. More recently, Brown has been read 
as establishing a color blind race-neutrality requirement that the 
Court now uses to invalidate race-conscious affirmative action 
and redistricting programs.266
There	is	now	a	fairly	standard	
litany	of	in	famous	decisions	
in	which	historical	Supreme	
Courts	have	openly	sacrificed	
the	interests	of	racial	minorities	
to	advance	the	interests	of	white	
slave	holders,	segregationists,	
and	other	white	suprema	cists.
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The tone and outcomes of the historical Court’s deci-
sions sometimes made the Court’s hostility to racial minority 
interests unmistakable. In frequently quoted language from his 
opinion in Dred	Scott, Chief Justice Taney described the fra mers’ 
view of black slaves. Not only could blacks not be citizens, but 
they were at the time considered as a subordi-
nate and inferior class of beings, who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to 
their au thority, and had no rights or privileges 
but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.267
Chief Justice Taney went on to say that blacks “had for 
more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either 
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect.”268 Hopefully, 
that is no longer a widely shared view of racial minorities, and it 
is certainly not a view that is often expressed in polite company. 
Nevertheless, the tone of Roberts Court race cases sometimes 
reflects a disregard of racial minority interests that strikes me as 
similarly callous.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci displays an under-
standably sincere concern for the interests of white firefighters 
who scored well on their promotion exams. However, it displays 
a near total lack of concern for the interests of racial minorities, 
who daily suf fer the relentless disparate-impact harms that Title 
VII was adopted and amended to prevent.269 Moreover, by adopt-
ing an unrealisti cally high standard for the avoidance of dispa-
rate-impact injuries, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to place 
any meaningful remedy for such harms beyond the practical reach 
of Title VII, and perhaps beyond the reach of the Constitution as 
well.270 The position of the disappointed New Haven firefight-
ers seems to be that abandoning a resource allocation criterion 
that favors whites constitutes racial discrimination against the 
white majority, and that seems to be the way the Roberts Court 
views thinJustice Alito’s refusal to uphold equal educational 
funding in the Horne English Language Education case also 
seems unneces sar ily to disregard the interests of racial minority 
students. The seventeen years that elapsed between the time the 
plaintiffs filed their class action and the time the Supreme Court 
remanded with out a remedy for yet additional proceedings, has 
a disquieting si milarity to the long period of time that elapsed 
after Brown, when the Supreme Court first acquiesced in South-
ern evasion of the Brown desegregation mandate but ultimately 
refused to deseg regate Northern and Western schools.271 Horne 
has a disquiet ing similarity to the Roberts Court’s more recent 
refusal to permit voluntary efforts to maintain hard-won integra-
tion in the Resegregation	Cases.272
The dictum suggestion of Chief Justice Roberts in 
Northwest	Austin, that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act might 
be unconsti tutional despite its recent overwhelming reauthori-
zation by Con gress, suggests a similar callousness to the inter-
ests of racial minorities.273 By its terms, the Voting Rights Act 
applies only to jurisdictions that have a history of minority voter 
disenfranchise ment. And by its terms the Act permits those juris-
dictions to make any changes they desire to their voting practices 
and proce dures, provided they can first demonstrate that they are 
not perpet u ating the sorts of past discrimination that caused them 
to become cov ered jurisdictions.274 Rather than acquiesce in the 
need for sus pect jurisdictions to make that showing, however, 
Chief Justice Roberts preferred to subject racial minorities to the 
danger of con tinued voter discrimination. Moreover, he did so 
in a political cli mate involving recent presidential elections that 
were rife with allegations of politically-partisan, minority voter 
disenfranchise ment.275
The aphorism with which Chief Justice Roberts chose to 
end his opinion in the Resegregation	Cases—“[t]he way to stop 
dis crimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi nating on 
the basis of race”276—conveys what is perhaps the most disturb-
ing tone of all of the Roberts Court’s post racial discrimination 
cases. Chief Justice Roberts appears to suggest that the problem 
of racial discrimination in the United States—a problem that has 
plag ued the nation for hundreds of years, since before the nation’s 
inception—is really not such a difficult problem after all. All we 
have to do to solve the pesky problem of racial discrimination 
is ignore the continuing legacy of past discrimination, and pro-
spectively behave in a colorblind, race neutral manner. Imagine 
how insulting it must be for racial minorities to be told that their 
problem can be solved in such a simple-minded manner.
There remains an enduring sense of white entitlement, 
hig h lighted by Cheryl Harris in Whiteness	As	Prop	erty,277 pursu-
ant to which whites have traditionally thought it natural to ex ploit 
racial minorities in order to advance white interests. Hillary Jor-
dan’s novel Mudbound278 illustrates this nicely. In the novel, 
post-sla very Southern white planters—who commonly cheated 
and abused their black workers—sat around vilifying the “nig-
gers” for moving North and leaving the planters with no one to 
harvest their crops, other than workers who would demand mar-
ket rates for their labor. The novel was set in the post-World War 
II era, but I fear that the attitude of entitlement that it captures is 
both less fictitious and less dated than one would hope.
I doubt that the conservative bloc members of the Rob-
erts Court share the racial sentiments expressed by Chief Jus-
tice Taney in Dred	Scott.279 Still, there is an aspect of Roberts 
Court postra cial discrimination that Dred	 Scott renders haunt-
ingly fa mil iar. Dred	Scott entailed the Supreme Court’s invalida-
tion of a con gres sional effort to solve a serious racial problem. 
As the subse quent Civil War indicates, the Court’s invalidation of 
that congres sional effort did not work out well. During Recon-
struction, the Supreme Court also engaged in efforts to limit or 
invalidate congressional efforts to solve our continuing racial 
problems. Again, the Supreme Court often chose to limit or 
invalidate those efforts. 280 Unfortunately, Roberts Court efforts 
to treat racial minorities as if they are no longer victims of dis-
crimination, in order to protect the interests of whites instead, 
share the hist orical Court’s propensity to marginalize or over-
rule congressional policies that have been adopted to help rem-
edy ra cial discrimina tion. The Roberts Court Justices certainly 
under stand this facet of Supreme Court history, but the conser-
vative bloc Justices have chosen to align themselves with those 
historical practices never theless. Separation of powers consider-
ations aside, it is simply not clear to me why the Roberts Court 
thinks it can do a better job of formulating race relations policy 
than the politically accountable, representative branches of gov-
ernment, or why the Roberts Court would want to align itself 
with the darker strands of Supreme Court racial history. I fear 
that the con servative bloc Justices on the Roberts Supreme Court 
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may actually consider themselves to be proud heirs of the racial 
atti tudes that they seem to have inherited from their predecessors.
cONcLuSION
The view that the Roberts Court seems to have of racial 
minor ities is disheartening. The Ricci firefighters decision sug-
gests that the Court’s conservative bloc majority favors the inter-
ests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. Moreover, 
the inten sity of that favoritism is strong enough to prompt the 
Court to cir cumvent statutory protections that Congress enacted 
precisely to prevent such racial favoritism. Because other Rob-
erts Court race decisions exhibit a similar favoritism, the Court’s 
preference for whites seems intentional and persistent, rather 
than inci dental or sporadic. The tone and outcome of the Court’s 
decisions are reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions that 
were openly hostile to racial minority rights. This suggests that 
contem porary racial attitudes may be more firmly rooted in the 
past than we would like to admit. The Roberts Court’s race deci-
sions seem premised on the view that we now live in a postra-
cial culture, where discrimination against racial minorities has 
largely ceased to exist, and our most serious racial problem is the 
problem of minor ities discriminating against whites. The election 
of Barack Obama notwithstanding, the systemic disadvantages 
that minorities con tinue to suffer relative to whites makes the 
assertion of that view seem disingenuous. It is as if the Supreme 
Court were simply looking for a novel justification to continue its 
time-honored practice of sacri fic ing racial minority rights for the 
benefit of whites.
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